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Envy and Jealousy: A Study of
Separation of Powers and Judicial
Review
by
LAURA E. LITTLE*

Analysts herald our governmental structure for its practical
design, its mindfulness of human weakness. Scholars praise the
Framers of our Constitution for their knowledge of history's examples
of past foibles in governmental schemes. Although lawmakers have
sometimes overlooked the effect of human emotions in constitutional
processes,' the Framers anticipated that emotions such as ambition
and rivalry are natural products of government. Most famous is
James Madison's admonition that under our institutional structures,
"[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition."' 2 Using principles
of separation of powers, the Founders tried to design our institutions
to harness such base human tendencies rather than allow them to
3
undermine government's operation.

* Professor of Law, Temple University, Beasley School of Law. Copyright 2000 held
by Laura E. Little. I am grateful for the comments of my colleagues, Jeffrey Dunoff and
Richard Greenstein, as well as the participants of a Temple Law School colloquium
focused on this article. I also acknowledge the able research assistance of Amy Miner,
Rose Kennedy, Greg Williams, Stephanie Berger, and especially Karen Klotz.
1. E.g., Samuel H. Pillsbury, Harlan, Holmes, and the Passions of Justice, in THE
PASSIONS OF LAW 330-62 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999) (examining the overlooked role of
emotion in the dissents in Lochner v. New York and Plessy v. Ferguson);Laura E. Little,
Loyalty, Gratitude, and the Federal Judiciary, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 699, 710, 728 (1995)
(exploring the inconsistency between the judicial duty of impartiality and the effect of the
judicial appointment process on individual judges' feelings of loyalty and gratitude toward
the legislative and executive branch officials responsible for judges' appointments).
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
[hereinafter Madison, FEDERALIST No. 51]; Id. at 321 (explaining that the "separate and
distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which... is... essential to the
preservation of liberty").
3. Id. at 322 (noting the wisdom of "supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the
defect of better motives"); Theodore Y. Blumoff, Illusions of Constitutional
Decisionmaking: Politicsand the Tenure Powers in the Court,73 IOWA L. REV. 1079, 1088
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Scholars have devoted much attention to evaluating how ably our
Constitution makes use of the rivalrous political impulses of those

who staff the government. Indeed, the Framers' general strategy of
harnessing the darker side of human emotion for the aid of a good,

such as responsible government, continues to find broadreaching
support.4 Many have studied how structural divisions within the
national government and between the state and national governments
control the ambitions of powerful blocks of governmental actors. 5
Legal analysts have also scrutinized the interplay between emotion
and the rule of law in a number of contexts. 6 What has escaped study,
however, is the individual, emotional response likely felt by those in

power:

jealousy and envy toward those in other branches of

government. Although some materials make cursory note of jealousy
as a force with which government must reckon,7 none explore in
(1988) ("Unwilling to separate authority, those who drafted the Constitution hoped forand guaranteed-political conflict by creating 'large degrees of jurisdictional overlap.'
Conflict was to be resolved not by recourse to the judiciary, but by recourse to the selfinterest connected to each office."); see also Philip B. Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the
"Doctrine" of Separation of Powers, 85 MICH. L. REV. 592, 594 (1986) ("The American
concept of separation of powers... is the prime example of the proposition that
experience rather than theory grounds the Constitution.").
An important distinction exists between harnessing conflicting passions within an
individual member of government and harnessing conflicting passions of competing
members of government. ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS:
POLITICAL ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH 30 (1977) (delineating
this distinction). Separation of powers reflects the latter more than the former. See infra
notes 141-45 and accompanying text for elaboration on the significance of this distinction.
4. The support extends to thinkers ancient and modern. Henry Staten notes that
Aristotle lists as a "virtue" the less than pristine human quality of "ambition" because it
promotes improved skill through incentive and practice.
Henry Staten, The
Deconstruction of Kantian Ethics and the Question of Pleasure, in LAW AND THE
POSTMODERN MIND: ESSAYS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS AND JURISPRUDENCE 68-69 (Peter
Goodrich & David Gray Carlson eds., 1998). Staten observes that positive interplay
among pleasure, capacity, and competence in people extends beyond the "individual
dialectic, it is caught in the web of what Lacan calls the symbolic order and in social.
political, and economic relations with others. It is this entanglement and these relations
that from the condition of possibility form the optimal exercise of the energeia of a human
being." Id. at 69.
5. E.g., M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 337

(2d ed. 1998) (describing the struggle of collective ambition among different branches of
government as a "continuing dividing force," whether the ambition is "simply to wield
power, to serve the people, to make money, or to make history"); Larry Kramer,
Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1516 (1994) (describing Hamilton's
and Madison's vision of how allocation of federal and state power would "thwart federal
ambition").
6. E.g., Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame: Implication for Legal Reform, 3
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 646 (1997) (exploring the role of shame in criminal penalties).
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depth the common sense notion that those who enjoy exercising
power for a living likely find themselves coveting, in a uniquely
personal way, the power of others. Nor do these materials explore
how envy and jealousy of power animate the tripartite organization of
our government. This article starts to fill that gap.
Separation of powers serves cross-purposes. On one hand, the
division of powers ensures that one branch can check the quest for
authority by another branch. At the same time, however, separation
of powers among governmental branches may exacerbate the quest
for power: by vesting one branch with power deprived to another, the
Constitution creates the opportunity for the deprived branch to covet
the forbidden power possessed by the other. The resulting jealousy
and envy can manifest in a variety of ways.
In fact, jealousy and envy among the branches of government
(and their constituent members) have a long history within the
7. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, 309 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(stating that, in Congress, the "people ought to indulge all their jealousy"); STEPHEN
HOLMES, PASSIONS & CONSTRAINTS 86 (1995) (listing the following examples of "socially
rampant" envy: ministers envy bishops, subordinate commanders envy generals, states
envy states, and neighboring nations envy neighboring nations); DUNCAN KENNEDY, A
CRrrIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 211-12 (1997) (analogizing jealousy in marriage with hidden
influences in adjudication: "I think we critics should proudly affirm the analogy between
our analysis of the ideological in adjudication and the Freudian tradition of hunting out
sexual motives where people are most concerned to conceal them."); Blumoff, supra note
3, at 1087 ("The appointment clause owes its birth to a conception of government impelled
by political tension. Ambition, with its demons jealousy and fear, rather than theoretical
pietism, nourished that conception. The tension built into the text of the appointment
clause was to feed on selfish motives."); Martin A. Feigenbaum, The Preservation of
Individual Liberty Through Separation of Powers and Federalism: Reflections on the
Shaping of ConstitutionalImmorality, 37 EMORY L.J. 613, 614 (1988) (explaining that the
Framers separated powers in government so that "individual liberties should not be
sacrificed for the convenience, jealousy, or self-interest of government"); Girardeau A.
Spann, Proposition209, 47 DUKE L.J. 187, 289 (1996) ("[Tlhe Framers counted on the
predictable phenomenon of institutional jealousy as part of the separation-of-powers
strategy that they adopted to check the excessive accumulation of power in one branch of
the national government."). Cf. Robert R. Peebles, Jr., Government Tort Liability in
Louisiana: A Response to ProfessorRobertson and a Callfor More Study, 65 TULANE L.
REV. 1055, 1072 (1991) (observing that Montesquieu's division of powers theory was
implemented in France to ameliorate a "paralyzing jealousy developed between the
administrative officers ... [and] judicial and political bodies").
Some scholars have thoughtfully analyzed personal ambition among political actors,
but have only skirted the questions of surrounding jealousy and envy. MARK TUSHNET,
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 99-128 (1999) (analyzing how

principles of "incentive-compatibility" may help create a government that harnesses
personal ambition for the good of the whole); William Michael Treanor, Fame, the
Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REX. 695, 740-56 (1997)
(analyzing how the Framers sought to design a constitutional structure that protected
against a president's desire to achieve fame by committing the country to war).
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Anglo-American tradition. A particularly colorful illustration comes
from the English Parliament's response to an early legal dictionary
written by John Cowell, known as The Interpreter. In The Interpreter,
Dr. Cowell had defined the monarch as an entity "aboue the
Parlament," possessing power and privilege "ouer and aboue other
8
persons, and aboue the ordinarie course of the common lawe."
Parliament reacted dramatically to Cowell's definition.
By
Proclamation in 1610, Parliament declared that Cowell's book
mistook "the true state of the Parliament of this Kingdom" and spoke
"unreverently of the Common Law of England, and the works of
some of the most famous and ancient judges therein." 9 Accordingly,
Parliament prohibited "the buying, uttering, or read[ing] of said
book" and commanded those having custody of the book to deliver it
to the Lord Mayor of London. 10
With a view toward tracking similar American struggles among
government branches, I researched a variety of materials -including
legislative hearing transcripts, congressional reports, and appellate
briefs filed by executive and legislative branch officials-in search of
evidence of these sentiments. My search bore sparse results. Instead,
judicial opinions yielded the most striking showing of jealousy and
envy.
Analysis of the judicial role in our government sheds light on this
contemporary evidence of jealousy and envy in the judiciary's work
product. If the judiciary deserves its description as the weakest and
least dangerous branch, it arguably possesses more reason than other
branches to envy the power of others and to guard jealously its power.
Yet the judiciary also enjoys a special power unmatched in the
institutional structure: the power of supreme judicial review."' This
8. FREDERICK C. HICKS, MEN AND BOOKS FAMOUS IN THE LAW 57 (1972) (quoting
JOHN COWELL, THE INTERPRETER).

9. Id. at 43 (quoting the March 25, 1610 proclamation, which did not appear in the
Journals of Parliament but was reprinted in the preface to the 1701 edition of Cowell's
THE INTERPRETER).

10. Id. at 43-44.
11. The following definition of judicial review highlights its role in heightening
interbranch jealousy and envy: "'Judicial review' refers to the judicial practice of
reviewing governmental action (or inaction) to see if it is as it is claimed to be by the party
challenging the action, unconstitutional." MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE
COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 6 n.* (1982).
By supreme judicial review, I refer to the notion that the judiciary has the final say as
to the meaning of the Constitution. In other words, the judiciary cannot only veto
interpretations by the executive and the legislature, but representatives of those two
branches must cede to the judicial interpretations even when they believe them to be
wrong.
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power vests the judiciary with an important and unique role in
government and, for that reason, judicial review provides a vehicle for
developing a sense of self that can help judges rise above the negative
aspects of jealousy and envy. On the other hand, the power of
judicial review enables judges to shroud their vulnerability with
scrutiny and criticism of other branches. This, in turn, opens an outlet
for negative emotions.
These competing sentiments form the irony of judicial review:
providing the judiciary with self-identification, esteemed institutional
status, and concomitantly with a potentially dangerous conduit for
playing out insecurities. This irony provides the organizing thesis for
this study, which starts first with a summary of constitutional doctrine
governing separation of powers and judicial review and, next, reviews
the understanding of jealousy and envy developed in other
disciplines. To provide concrete context for later analysis, I then
survey textual examples of these sentiments in United States Supreme
Court decisions. Turning to the heart of this project, I next use the
interdisciplinary material to explore three major institutional
2
questions that currently capture the attention of legal scholars.' I
analyze how understanding jealousy and envy contributes to scholarly
debates over the appropriate breadth and depth of judicial review,
including whether the power is best exercised in certain subject areas,
such as individual rights, separation of powers, or federalism
questions. In my final section, I wrestle with the mixed messages
jealousy and envy material holds for thinkers evaluating two
formalism and
competing approaches to decisionmaking:
functionalism.

12. Focusing on psychoanalytic theory, Peter Goodrich offers the following words of
endorsement for this type of interdisciplinary project:
Psychoanalysis offers a technique, a practice, of analysis that refuses to tolerate
the abstraction or denial that constitutes the dogmatic discourse of law in an
exteriority for which the lawyer pretends to be unaccountable. In place of the
distance or defense of the legal persona, psychoanalysis addresses the
unthinkable, the repressed discourses, the desires, of the subjects of law, specific
individuals, specific legal actors.
LAW

AND

THE

POSTMODERN

MIND:

ESSAYS

ON

PSYCHOANALYSIS

JURISPRUDENCE 11 (Peter Goodrich & David Gray Carlson eds., 1998).

AND
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I. Separation of Powers and Judicial Review: Tradition and
Theory
A. Separation of Powers: Constitutional Text and History
(1) General Principles
An important insight into our constitutional structure lies in the
Framers' appreciation that "the science of government has [not] been
able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three
great provinces-the legislative, executive, and judiciary. 1 3 The
Framers understood that simply articulating boundaries for
prescribed activities may not be sufficient to reign in the ambitions of
each branch of government. 14 They sought instead to supplement
defined roles with an internal structure designed to minimize
interbranch conflicts. Much of the Framers' efforts were designed to
protect the governed from overreaching governmental branches.
More pertinent to this article is the Framers' narrower concern with
controlling one branch's incursions on other branches.
Our Framers' "auxiliary precautions" 15 against governmental
abuse are reflected in the familiar constraints on all three branches.
For the legislative branch, the requirement of bicameralism limits
legislative power to those laws passed only by two houses of
Congress. 16 Similarly, the requirement that legislation be "presented
to the President" 7 allows for the executive to veto legislative
exertions that encroach on executive power or that run counter to the
13. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, 228 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
14. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, 442 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)

[hereinafter Hamilton, FEDERALIST NO. 73] (noting remarks about the "insufficiency of a
mere parchment delineation of the boundaries" for each governmental branch). Records
of Madison's statement at the convention reflect a similar theme:
If the Constitutional discrimination of the departments on paper were a sufficient
security to each ag[ainst] encroachments of the others, all further provisions
would indeed be superfluous. But experience had taught us... that it is
necessary to introduce such a balance of powers and interests, as will guarantee
the provisions on paper.
James Madison, 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 77 (Max

Farrand rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter Madison, RECORDS].
15. Madison, FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 2, at 322 (explaining that control over
government comes from the government's "dependence on the people" as well as
"auxiliary precautions").
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (vesting "[aIll legislative Powers" in "a Congress of the
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives").
17. Id. at § 7 (providing that before becoming law, each bill shall "be presented to the

President of the United States").
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executive's vision of the public interest. 18 Restraints on executive
power are less explicit, and derive primarily from the executive's
"general dependence" on congressional assertions of power in the
form of statutes, which control the executive's mode of action.19 The

President is, however, directly constrained under the Appointments
Clause, 20 under which the President cannot appoint judges or high
ranking executive officials without the approval of the Senate. The
Senate's "advice and consent" power over treaties provides a similar
limitation. 2'
Moreover, the Constitution's provision for veto
override2 increases the President's accountability by forcing the
President to consider the possibility that Congress may muster the
votes to override a presidential veto. Finally, the judiciary holds both
the executive and legislative branches accountable through the
implicit constitutional power of judicial review2 3 Despite this
important check, the judiciary's own power is constrained
dramatically by its passive role of hearing only "cases" or
"controversies," 24 by congressional control over federal court
jurisdiction and budgets, and more subtly by sentiments generated by
the nomination and confirmation process, such as loyalty and
gratitude toward those members of the executive and legislature who
facilitated particular judicial appointments. 25
These various provisions illustrate the Framers' two structural

techniques for avoiding concentrated power:
delineating the
authority each branch enjoys and granting each branch powers over
18. Hamilton, FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 14, at 443 (arguing that the veto power
guards "the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse
unfriendly to the public good"); Harold J. Krent, Separatingthe Strands in Separation of
Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REv. 1253, 1266 (1988) (maintaining that the
presentment requirement circumscribes "Congress's ability to pass laws that would
encroach on the coordinate branches of government and harm the public at large").
19. Krent, supra note 18, at 126.
20. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 2 (stating that the President "shall nominate, and by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States").
21. Ild.
(stating that the President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties").
22- Id at art. I, § 7 (providing for reconsideration of a bill after veto and passage into
law if the bill garners two thirds of the vote in each house of Congress).
23. E.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 13-16 (1962)
(maintaining that, although not explicit, judicial review was part of the general
understanding regarding the scope of judicial power under the Constitution).
24. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
25. Little, supra note 1, at 710-36 (exploring the likely effect of the nomination and
confirmation process creating loyalty and gratitude toward the judge's benefactors).
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the other. 26 The resulting constitutional form bears inherent tensions.
First, the Framers' vision of each branch was not free from
contradiction. The constitutional debates reflected inconsistent views
of the various branches. For example, George Mason cited divergent
attitudes toward the legislature: "At one moment we are told that the
Legislature is entitled to thorough confidence, and to indefinite
power. At another, it will be governed by intrigue & corruption, and
cannot be trusted at all."' 27 Contradictory impulses are also reflected

in the Framers' strategy of both separating and integrating the
branches.2 8 To this end, the Framers abandoned theoretical principle
29
in favor of pragmatism.
The constitutional text reflects this pragmatic approach by its
silence about separation of powers theory as well as about precise30
distinctions among legislative, executive, and judicial powers.
Interestingly, the House of Representatives adopted a 1789
constitutional amendment by James Madison, which articulated a
strict theory of independence for each governmental branch. 31 This

26. An implicit element of these strategies is the concept of "separation of persons,"
which ensures that "the three branches of government shall be composed of quite separate
and distinct groups of people, with no overlapping membership." VILE, supra note 5,at
18.
27. Madison, RECORDS, supra note 14, at 31.
28. E.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15-16 (1978) (The
American constitutional structure evinces both independence and interdependence of the
branches); Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: "Converse-1983" in Context, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1237 (1995) (political jealousy among competing institutions "serves
to diffuse power and prevent 'the accumulation of all powers.., in the same hands"')
(quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47, 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
29. William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminancyof the Separationof Powers in the Age of the
Framers, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 263, 263 (1989) (explaining that the Framers and the
first members of government "were concerned more with improving the efficiency and
capabilities of the national government than with creating a system of government based
on the abstract maxims of political philosophers"); Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective
Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1993) (describing the notion that the
Constitution is devoid of theories expanding executive powers beyond that of a "legal
executive"); Suzanna Sherry, Separation of Powers: Asking a Different Question. 30 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 287, 288-90 (1989) (arguing that initially Congress was more concerned
with effectiveness than with theory); Samuel W. Cooper, Note, Considering "Power" in
Separation of Powers, 46 STAN. L. REV. 361, 366-67 (1994) (stating that the founders
"cared more about workability than theory").
30. Gwyn, supra note 29, at 263.
31. The amendment, which would have been placed before the existing Article VII.
provided as follows:
The powers delegated by this Constitution, are appropriated to the departments
to which they are respectively distributed: so that the legislative department
shall never exercise the powers vested in the executive or judicial; nor the
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amendment would have provided a clear principle for interpreting

separation of powers questions, but was rejected by the Senate for
unknown reasons. 32 Moreover, while the Constitution refers to the

Congress possessing34 "legislative powers," 33 the President holding the
"executive power," and the courts possessing "judicial power, ' 35 the
checks and balances system blurs these distinctions. Thus, the Senate

performs an executive role concerning appointments, 36 the President
performs a legislative function in vetoing legislation, 37 and the House

and Senate perform executive and judicial roles when indicting and
38
trying cases of impeachment.

(2) The Judiciary: Weak or Strong?

Received wisdom describes the judiciary, with its passive role of
receiving and resolving cases or controversies, as the least powerful of
all the branches.39 Some scholars have taken issue with this
proposition.4 0 Indeed, weakness is conspicuously absent from Chief

executive exercise the powers in the legislative or judicial; nor the judicial
exercise the powers vested in the legislative or executive departments.
12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 202 (C. Hobson & R. Rutland eds., 1979), quoted in

Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separationof Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices,
30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 211,221 (1989).
32. Casper, supra note 31, at 222.
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
34. Id. at art. II, § 1.
35. Id. at art. III, § 1.
36. Id. at art. II, §2.
37. Id. at art. I, § 7.
38. Id. at art. I, §§ 2-3.
39. E.g., BICKEL, supra note 23, at 14 (outlining the weakness of the judicial branch);
BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 156 (Thomas Nugent trans., 1949)
(of the three branches, the "judiciary is in some measure next to nothing"); ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 99-100 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence
trans., 1969) (noting limitations on the American judiciary's "sphere of action"); THE
FEDERALIST No. 78, 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating that
"the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the
political rights of the Constitution").
40. E.g., FRANK R. STRONG, JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION
OF GOVERNMENTAL POWER 153-70 (1997) (describing the "threat of an imperial
judiciary"). Justice Jackson described the judiciary's ascendency to power as follows:
The Supreme Court has, from the very nature of its functions, been deep in
power politics from the opening of the Court ....It has moved with such
mastery that by 1933 it had established a supremacy that could deny important
power to both state and nation on principles nowhere found in the Constitution
itself, or could allocate powers as between state and nation, or between Congress
and the executive departments, and could largely control the economic and social
policy of the country.
ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY viii-ix (1941).
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Justice Marshall's announcement that the judicial province is "to say
''
what the law is.
41
Yet most thinkers find profound limitations
flowing from the judiciary's inability to initiate reform and to enforce
wide ranging social policies with the vigor of Congress and the
Executive. Not only are its constitutionally prescribed roles selflimiting, but the federal judiciary experiences dramatic restrictions
from Congress, on whom the federal courts rely for the resources
necessary to satisfy the modern appetite for litigation.42
Regardless of their view of the judiciary's overall potency,
scholars agree that substantial power derives from the prerogative to
review the actions of other federal departments for compliance with
the Constitution. 43 Thus, whether one starts from the view of the
judiciary as a co-equal or as a lesser branch, the power of
constitutional review is a significant component of the judiciary's selfimage. While other means exist for judges to influence other
branches, such means tend to be indirect, incremental, reversible, or
subtle. 44 Judicial review, however, allows the judiciary to invalidate
the actions of other branches both directly and explicitly. This
invalidation is largely irreversible except by a judicial official of the
same rank or by a constitutional amendment.
The operation of Article III's life tenure further complicates the
dynamic among the judiciary and the two other branches, thereby
enhancing the potential sting of judicial review. As national policy

41. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
42. Professor Judith Resnik argues that "Article III looks thin" in its protection of the
judiciary against the incursion of other branches. Professor Resnik argues that Article III
provides only for life tenure and individual salary protection, and misses the
institutional needs of a judiciary, functioning in an administrative state either
as a branch of government or as a provider of services to the millions of

litigants that seek its attention. As the judiciary transforms itself, in part to
meet those needs, it is ever more reliant on Congress-for staff, for surrogate
and subsidiary judges, for its very ability to work, let alone to be a player in
governance.
Judith Resnik, JudicialIndependence and Article III: Too Little and Too Much, 72 S.CAL.
L. REV. 657, 668 (1999). Recent experience with congressional scrutiny of the judiciary by
Senator Grassley provides support for this position.
43. E.g., JESSE H.

CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL

PROCESS 62 (1980) (describing the power of judicial review as "prodigious"); ROBERT
DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 106 (1956) (judicial review enjoys

particular "strategic importance" because of the difficulty of amending the Constitution).
44. WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 169-70 (1964)
(observing that the Supreme Court can influence Congress and the Executive by
"interpretations of statutes or executive orders, denials of certiorari, dismissals of
appeals ....capitalization on procedural errors,.., public speeches, or informal personal
contact").
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evolves, a schism may occur between those representing the former
policies and those representing the new. Changes may spawn
litigation, and the legitimacy of the new policy may be put before the
courts for evaluation. Staffed by those enjoying life tenure, courts

tend to represent the old order.45

Thus, initiatives by those

representing new policies in Congress and the Executive routinely

face judges who are not only from an earlier administration, but who
also are likely to represent the legal views and dispositions of an older

generation. 46 Justice Jackson once explained that "[t]he judiciary is
thus the check of a preceding generation on the present one; a check

of conservative legal philosophy upon a dynamic people, and nearly
always the check of a rejected regime on the one in being." 47 These
complicated dynamics-as well as the mere potency of judicial
review-confirm the judicial review power as a crucial factor in
evaluating the role of jealousy and envy in the federal system.
B. Doctrine and Theory

While many cite the "countermajoritarian difficulty" of judicial
49
review,48 it remains firmly entrenched in institutional consciousness.
45. Justice Jackson provides the following narrative of this dynamic:
The Federalist Party Executives, Washington and Adams, had no differences
with the judiciary. They appointed all of the judges. But at every turn in
national policy where the cleavage between the old order and the new was sharp,
the new President has faced a judiciary almost wholly held over from the
preceding regime.
JACKSON, supra note 40, at 315.
46. Ik (explaining that "[tihe operation of life tenure in the judicial department, as
against elections at short intervals of the Congress, usually keeps the average viewpoint of
the institutions a generation apart").
47. Ic.; DEBORAH J. BARROW ET AL., THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY AND
INsTITUTIONAL CHANGE 95-102 (1996) (outlining bench expansion, voluntary turnover,
and changing career patterns, which may influence this dynamic in the future).
48. E.g., BICKEL, supra note 23, at 16-23.
49. Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, 69
TEX. L. REv. 1881, 1924 (1991) (observing that "judicial review is itself an institution so
firmly established in our political, social, and professional consciousness that its continued
existence is utterly unassailable"). See also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the
Wrong Question: An Essay on ConstitutionalScholarshipand JudicialReview, 62 TEX. L.
REV. 1207, 1209 (1984) (noting that critics of judicial activism do not want to abolish
judicial review).
The writings of Robert Nagel, a leading advocate of judicial restraint, illustrates this
point. Nagel does not seek to abolish judicial review, but instead argues that "excessive
reliance on judicial review is undermining both fidelity to constitutional principles and the
ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL
general health of the political culture."
CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1 (1989). See
also CHOPER, supra note 43, at 263-275, 388-404 (criticizing present rules for judicial
review, yet arguing that review should be restricted for only certain kinds of questions);
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Despite its apparent stronghold in our government, the precise

contours of judicial review are fuzzy.

Recent Supreme Court

precedent cements the broad proposition that the Supreme Court has

the ultimate power to say what the Constitution means. 50 However,
Congress or the Executive actually gets the last word on what the
Constitution means in circumstances when judicial review of
congressional or executive action is unavailable because of technical
matters such as justiciability limits. 51

Perhaps the most popular justification for judicial review is
protecting minority rights. 52 To support this concept, 53 some argue
that the judiciary enjoys unique institutional qualities that make it the

most appropriate branch to bear the responsibility of final arbiter of
constitutional meaning. Among the qualities cited are the judiciary's

independence

and limited role of resolving only cases and

controversies, its role as an opinion leader,54 its practice of justifying

its decisions with legal reasoning in written published opinions, 55 and
institutional norms that counsel the judiciary to be "objective.

'56

John Harrison, The ConstitutionalOrigins and Implications of Judicial Review, 84 VA. L.
REV. 333, 377 (1998) (arguing that the logic of judicial review justifies executive review,
but does not undercut the final power of the judiciary to declare constitutional meaning).
But see TUSHNET, supra note 7, at 127-28 (arguing that we should leave our entire
Constitution to be self-enforcing so long as certain conditions can be met). The position of
Tushnet, Choper, and Nagel are discussed in more detail at infra notes 187-202, 208-09,
221-28, and accompanying text.
50. E.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516-19 (1997).
51. Michael W. McConnell, Institutionsand Interpretation: Critique of City of Boerne
v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 171 (1997).
52. Kevin L. Yingling, Note, Justifying the Judiciary, 15 J.L. & POL. 81, 104 (1999)
(observing that the minority protection justification is "the most often cited reason for
having judicial review").
53. The justification owes lineage to famous footnote four of United States v.
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938), and took a position in the forefront of
constitutional scholarship in large part by virtue of the analysis of John Hart Ely. JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:

A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 135-79

(1980).
54. BICKEL, supra note 23, at 239: CHOPER, supra note 43, at 68 (arguing that courts

are better than other branches for interpreting the Constitution because "the more
deliberative, contemplative quality of the judicial process.., lends itself to dispassionate
decisionmaking").
55. Louis Michael Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1571,
1574 (1988) (explaining the opinion writing tradition exposes the judicial thought process
and enables criticism of the proffered justifications for a decision).
56. Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1979) (reasoning that both a judge's independence and
"obligation to participate in a dialogue" are institutional norms "that enable and perhaps
even force the judge to be objective"); CHOPER, supra note 43, at 68 (arguing that "the
Court's aloofness from the political system and the Justice's lack of dependence for
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Critics respond to these justifications by noting the ties between
judicial review and ordinary politics. 57 Whether or not criticism
successfully guts judicial review of legitimacy, the various qualities
characterizing the judicial function nevertheless remain relevant to
understanding how envy and jealousy may influence decisionmaking.
Also important to understanding how jealousy and envy affect the
judicial process are the different contexts in which a federal judge
Because judicial review concerns
engages in judicial review.
adjudication of constitutional provisions, one can organize the review
process according to the type of provision under scrutiny: provisions
delineating separation of powers at a national level, provisions
allocating power between the states and the national government, and
those designating personal liberties that limit all governmental
power 5 8 For each of these categories, the Supreme Court has
developed traditions and modes of analysis.

maintenance in office on the popularity of a particular ruling promise an objectivity that
elected representatives are not... capable of achieving").
57. TUSHNET, supra note 7, at 152 (noting how the nomination process "creates fairly
close connections between ordinary politics and judicial review"); Winter, supra note 49,
at 1925 ("[J]udges cannot even think without implicating the dominant normative
assumptions that shape their society and reproduce their political and cultural context.");
See also Little, supra note 1, at 728 (analyzing the effect of the nomination process in
creating in judges feelings of loyalty and gratitude towards the benefactors that made
possible their judgeships).
Public choice theory has substantially contributed to the debate about whether
judicial review can be justified as a protection against the tyranny of the majority.
Unfortunately, the literature is inconclusive. According to one line of argument, wellorganized, homogenous groups of minorities can influence legislative and administrative
processes to a degree disproportionate to their numbers or to the "overall gains and losses
at stake." Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism: The
Supreme Court's Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2213, 2218
(1996). Under this view, one may argue that free discussion and political action, not
judicial review, will ensure that women, gays, racial and ethnic minorities, and others will
enjoy adequate legal protection. Id. at 2221. Others use this observation about interest
groups to suggest that judicial invalidation of legislation may promote a majoritarian result
in instances where the legislation reflects the influence of nonmajoritarian interest groups.
Michael J. Klarman, MajoritarianJudicialReview: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO.
L.J. 491, 495 (1997). No matter what one argues, however, both conclusions are subject to
the criticism that it is difficult to pin down "an uncontroversial baseline measure of
'appropriate' interest group influence." Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory
Justify More IntrusiveJudicialReview?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 49-59 (1991).
58. E.g., CHOPER, supra note 43, at 61 (delineating the three categories of
constitutional mandates). But cf. Jack Wade Nowlin, The ConstitutionalLimits of Judicial
Review: A Structural Interpretive Approach, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 521, 532-33 (1999)
(arguing that questions concerning judicial review of personal liberties are essentially
questions concerning structural questions such as federalism and separation of powers).
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As elaborated in Part IV below, contemporary scholars
vigorously debate the appropriate standard of judicial review for each
of these three categories -disagreeing primarily over the question
whether separation of powers and federalism questions deserve more
or less judicial scrutiny than individual rights questions.5 9 Literature
on jealousy and envy may shed light on this debate as well as the most
appropriate mode of analysis used by the Supreme Court in reviewing
the different categories of constitutional questions.
In a related dialogue, some contemporary scholars have heralded
a minimal role for the judiciary, admonishing federal judges to avoid
resolving socially sensitive issues and, instead, leave "fundamental
issues undecided. ' 60 This plea for self-restraint is equally relevant to
jealousy and envy. These sentiments are an important part of the
dynamic of self-restraint, which may possibly be enhanced by the
dignity and courtliness fostered by minimalism or undercut by the
human need to act on preexisting jealousy or envy. As examined
more deeply below, the positive or negative manifestation of jealousy
and envy may turn, in part, on which of the diverse mechanisms for
judicial deference are employed. Such mechanisms can include
"humility and caution in the declaration of potentially far-reaching
new constitutional principles, respect for the customs and mores of
the times," 61 adherence to canons of avoidance that show deference
to other branches and levels of government, and reliance on technical
devices such as a justiciability doctrines. Below, I survey the jealousy
and envy literature for material useful to evaluating the arguments of
those who advocate minimal judicial review for all purposes as well as
those who advocate stratifying judicial review according to subject
matter.

59. E.g., CHOPER, supra note 43, at 64 (advocating greater scrutiny of individual rights
questions than those pertaining to legislative/executive separation of powers and
federalism); PERRY, supra note 11, at 49-60 (advocating deferential review for separation

of powers questions); Hovenkamp, supra note 57, at 2218-21 (arguing for deferential
review for federalism decisions). For further discussion of these issues, see infra notes 221240 and accompanying text.
60. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME:

JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE

SUPREME COURT (1999). Sunstein's position bears some resemblance to the arguments of
Alexander Bickel, who maintained that the Supreme Court should use its "passive
virtues" to forestall or avoid constitutional adjudication. BICKEL, supra note 23, at 111-98.
See also Neal Devins, The Courts: The Democracy-Forcing Constitution, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 1971, 1972 (1999) (describing Bickel as a "classic minimalist"). For further
discussion of Sunstein and others advocating restraint or minimalism, see infra notes 20820 and accompanying text.
61. NAGEL, supra note 49, at 25.
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H. Envy and Jealousy in Social Science Literature
I cast my net widely in reviewing social science and humanities
literature on jealousy and envy, but found most materials on these
emotions in the literature of psychology, sociology, and political
Most strikingly, my review exposed remarkable
philosophy.
approach to both emotions among scholars writing
the
in
unanimity
in different disciplines as well as in different millennia.
A. Definitions of Envy and Jealousy

Scholars disagree whether definitional distinctions between
jealousy and envy are analytically useful. 62 Some analysts highlight
the two-person quality of envy (where one person desires something
the other possesses) and contrast this with a three-person dynamic of
jealousy (where one person fears losing another to a third person). 63
Given this distinction, envy is more pertinent to separation of powers,
which works to allocate power among competing entities rather than
umpiring relationships among the three departments. Similarly, envy
is also more relevant to federalism issues, since only two categories of
government power are engaged.
Yet another approach defines the distinctions in a way that
makes both envy and jealous equally relevant to struggles for power
among competing governmental entities: "envy concerns what one
would like to have but does not possess, jealousy centers on what one
yet a third outlook, some
has and does not wish to lose."'64 Offering
65
theorists use the terms interchangeably.
62. Susan A. Bers & Judith Rodin, Social-ComparisonJealousy: A Developmental and
MotivationalStudy, 47 3. PERSONALITY & SOc. PSYCHOL. 766, 766 (1984) (maintaining
that "efforts to draw a distinction between feelings of jealousy versus envy have not had
heuristic value").
63. E.g., W. Gerrod Parrott & Richard H. Smith, Distinguishing the Experiences of
Envy and Jealousy, 64 J.PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 906, 906 (1993) (explaining the
"traditional distinction" as "[e]nvy involves two elements (oneself and a person to whom
one compares poorly), whereas jealousy requires three (oneself, a partner with whom one
has a relationship, and a rival to whom one fears that this relationship will be lost)");
Mercedes Briones Redzepi & Robert C. Lane, The Psychodynamics of Envy:
Development, Defenses, Consequences and Treatment, in 16 PSYCHOTHERAPY IN
PRiVATE PRACrICE 27, 29-33 (1997) (describing two-person and three-person models);
Roberta Pollack Seid, Driven by Envy, SHAPE, Nov. 1998, at 42 (describing the twoperson and three person models).
64. ROSEMARY LLOYD, CLOSER & CLOSER APART: JEALOUSY IN LITERATURE xi
(1995) (literary criticism); PETER VAN SOMMERS, JEALOUSY 1 (1988) (adopting the same
distinction in interdisciplinary study of sexual jealousy).
65. Even Shakespeare sometimes treated the two sentiments as interchangeable:
Oh beware my Lord of jealousy;
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Given the overlap of these usages 66 among and within different
disciplines and given my commitment to capturing a broad spectrum
of learning analyzing jealousy and envy, I originally declined to reject
or to embrace any particular position on the similarities and
distinctions between the two emotions. Instead, I reviewed all
literature on both sentiments that was potentially relevant to the
judicial review problems forming the centerpiece of this article.
Ultimately, however, I concluded that my focus on the irony of the
federal courts' strengths and weaknesses counseled in favor of
adopting the second formulation: envy describing a desire to possess
what another has, jealousy describing what one has but fears losing to
another. I maintain this distinction throughout this article.
Despite the broad scope of my research, I avoided scholarship
analyzing emotions springing from sexual relationships-which
provides less pertinent analogies for governmental actors than
scholarship focusing on the interplay among individual components of
a system or structure. 67 I did, however, embrace the distinction
offered by many thinkers between rivalry and the emotions of
jealousy and envy. Rivalry is a more constructive emotion, closer to
emulation and competition than the other two sentiments. 68 This
It is the green-eyed monster which doth mock
The meat it feed on ....
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3.
66. For the purposes of psychology literature, Susan Bers and Judith Rodin, theorists
who reject any meaningful difference between envy and jealousy, propound yet another
distinction: Bers and Rodin identify challenges to an individual's "superiority or
equality," denominated "social-comparison jealousy," and contrast this with challenges to
an individual's "exclusivity in a relationship," called "social-relations jealousy." Bers &
Rodin, supra note 62, at 767 (differentiating social comparison and social relations
jealousy). While both sentiments may shed light on relationships among the various
branches of government, the latter provides less insight than the former. Indeed, the
latter - social-relations jealousy-often encompasses problems emanating from sexual
relationships-problems I avoid for the purposes of this article.
67. Along a similar vein, I have not concentrated my survey on those studies of envy
and jealousy intimately tied to theories of sexual development or analysis of oral, anal, and
genital phases of development. E.g., Redzepi & Lane, supra note 63, at 29-33 (surveying
the analysis of envy by Melanie Klein, Sigmund Freud, and others).
68. Cicero explains that rivalry can include "imitation of virtue" and emulation,
whereas jealousy is "distress rising from the fact that the thing one has coveted oneself is
in the possession of the other man as well as one's own." CICERO, TUSCULAN
DISPUTATIONS IV, at viii, 17, 346-47 (J.E. King trans., 1989). E.g., JOSEPH H. BERKE.
THE TYRANNY OF MALICE 61 (1988) (arguing that envious anger is different from rivalry
because envy "lingers... after a frustration has been overcome, a specific hurt repaid. a
rival removed ....Envy ...is not dependent on, or necessarily related to, anything
actually happening."); EUGENE W. MATHES, JEALOUSY: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DATA
5-6 (1992) (distinguishing jealousy from rivalry because jealousy requires actual or
threatened loss of a coveted object). See also CICERO, supra note 68, at 346-47 ("[T]he
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distinction is significant for this article, given the apparent focus by
Madison and others on the role of rivalry and ambition, not jealousy
or envy, in tailoring the structure of our government.
B. Reactions to Envious and Jealous Feelings
(1) Envy

Many thinkers have identified envy as most likely to arise among
those having something in common. Aristotle and Plato observed
that envy most often ignites among those who know each other and
share significant qualities. 69 Similarly, Thomas Aquinas notes that we
"envy not those that are far from us, in time and state, but those near,
whom we try to equal or excel. '70 Interestingly, Aquinas notes that
when others "excel over us by too much we do not envy."'71 Following
this tradition, David Hume writes that only "proximity" produces
envy because the emotion arises by comparison, a process that
meaningfully takes place between similar or close beings. 72 In like
vein, Adam Smith wrote that "the masses never envy their
superiors." 73 Modem philosophers have echoed this observation,
mark of rivalry is to be worried by one's neighbour's good if one is conscious of not
possessing it oneself, while the mark of the envious man is to be worried by the
neighbour's good because he is conscious that another possesses it as well as he.").
69. Aristotle, Rhetoric, in 9 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 1388a, at 593,
634 (Robert Maynard Hutchins et al. eds., W. Rhys Roberts trans., Encyclopedia
Britannica, Inc. 1952) ("envy is feeling among those who are or appear as our equals" in
the sense of those who share "proximity of time, place, fame, birth"); PLATO, LYSiS OR
FRIENDSHIP, THE SYMPOSIUM, PHAEDRUS 215d, at 7, 34 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1968)
(envy is "common among equals"). See also, GONZALO FERNANDEZ DE LA MORA,
EGALITARIAN ENVY 125 (1987) which adds subtly to this thought:
One only envies what was previously known, which is usually near, but not
necessarily. We may also envy the happiness of someone distant through a
fictive or real description. The promoters of enviable images and the instigators
of the feelings of envy deliver to their clientele a prefabricated envy; this is the
way of the demagogic mass media.

Id
70. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, in 20 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN
WORLD 380,567 (Robert Maynard Hutchins et al. eds., Fathers of the English Dominican
Province trans., Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 19th ed. 1971).
71. Id., in 20 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 380, 567 (Robert Maynard
Hutchins et al. eds., Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Encyclopedia
Britannica, Inc. 19th ed. 1971).

72. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE: BEING AN ATTEMPT TO
INTRODUCE THE EXPERIMENTAL METHOD OF REASONING INTO MORAL SUBJECTS 275,
367-77 ( L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford University Press 14th ed. 1967).
73. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 47 (D.D. Raphael & A.L.
Macfie eds., 1976). Freud showed a similar analysis in suggesting that the first envy arises
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noting that envy tends to flourish where individuals perceive
inequality among themselves and develop the causal sense that one

person's gain is another entity's loss.74
While agreeing with the general concept of this "neighborhood
theory" of envy, Jon Elster argues that the theory is oversimplistic.
He maintains instead that envy's intensity is "probably an inverse Ushaped function of the distance between the other and myself. ' 75 He

argues that the strength of envy depends on how much there is to be
envious about-with little envy arising from incremental differences
between the object of envy and the envier. One would expect the

envy to increase as the difference becomes greater, although the envy
starts to diminish again once the difference becomes so vast that the

envier is unable to "come up with a plausible story" about how the
76
envier should be the one to possess the coveted quality or object.

Scholars have identified a number of common defenses to
envious feelings.

Perhaps the most common occurs when the

individual experiencing envy devalues the desired object or
characteristic in order to convince herself that it is not worth

possessing-a
defense invoked by Aesop's Fox declaring the grapes
'77
"sour.

This defense can operate by denial or repression and is

often ineffectual in reducing envy's influence. 78 Similarly, the envier
may attempt to lower the envied person by criticism, which may be
used as "an attempt to eliminate the envied socially. ' 79 Criticism can

among siblings in response to competition for parental love. FERNANDEZ
supra note 69, at 79.
74. E.g., JON

ELSTER,

ALCHEMIES

OF THE MIND:

DE LA MORA.

RATIONALITY

AND

THE

EMOTIONS 169 (1999) (arguing that envy results when the envier believes she could have
been like the object of the envy); Aaron Ben-Ze'ev, Envy and Inequality, 89 J. PHIL. 551,
577 (1992) (arguing that envy is exacerbated when the envier believes that object of envy
enjoys something that the envier could have enjoyed).
75. ELSTER, supra note 74, at 170.
76. Id.
77. E.g., HAROLD N. BORIS, ENVY 12-13 (1994); MELANIE KLEIN, ENVY AND
GRATITUDE AND OTHER WORKS 1946-1963, at 216 (1975); Redzepi & Lane, supra note
63, at 35; Peter Solovey, Some Antecedents and Consequences of Social-Comparison
Jealousy, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 780, 782 (1984); cf Arthur G. Bedeian,
Workplace Envy, 23 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 49, 52. 54 (1995) (describing the
process by which the envier either "negatively distort[s]" competitors' success or attributes
that success to something other than merit, such as "fate" or "luck").
78. Alan D. Rosenblatt, M.D., Envy, Identification, and Pride,77 PSYCHOANALYTIC
Q.56, 64-65 (1988) (stating that such a maneuver distorts reality and may preclude more
effective action).
79. FERNANDEZ DE LA MORA, supra note 69, at 125; ELSTER, supra note 74.
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take the form of omitting positive attributes of the envied,8 0
magnifying negative attributes,8 ' or fabricating faults. This tendency
can be explained as the envier's attempt to "restore an equilibrium"
by bringing about equality between the envier and the envied. 82 Yet,
as Jon Elster argues, such a reaction is deeply irrational because the
envier is not only likely to damage others' esteem for her by such
destructive actions, but is also unlikely to raise her own s6lf-esteem by

manufacturing an equilibrium. Elster likens the strategy of elevating
pleasure from compliments
oneself by diminishing another to "getting
83
I pay another person to make me.1
Individuals may also respond by devaluing themselves, avoiding
the anxiety of envy by taking themselves "out of the running" as a
competitor or rival of the envied person.84 The result can be quite
destructive because the envying individual not only denies
experiencing envy, but also punishes herself for the sentiment.85
A similarly self-destructive, albeit passive, defense includes
suppressing feelings of love toward the envied person, feigning
indifference, withdrawing from contact with others, and developing
independence so as to avoid feelings or expressions of gratitude and
guilt.86 On the more active side, the envying person may respond by
trying to "stir up envy in others by one's own success, possessions,
and good fortune." 7 Psychologists have also identified idealization as
a defense, with the envying person "exaggerating the value of the88
desired attitude" so as to make it a worthy object of worship.
Finally, a more positive, and altogether different, reaction occurs
80. FERNANDEZ DE LA MORA, supra note 69, at 75 (describing this process as
"persecution by omission").
81. Id. (providing the following examples of finding fault in virtue: the envious "finds
intellectual mediocrity in athletes, physical weakness in geniuses, aesthetic insensibility in
scientists, lack of knowledge in artists, extravagance in innovators, vulgarity in
traditionalists").
82. ELSTER, supranote 74, at 171.
83. Id. at 172, 181.
84. E.g., KLEIN, supra note 77, at 216. Klein also argues that an individual
experiencing envy may also become confused about whether the object of envy is actually
good or bad. According to Klein, this confusion can reduce envy, although results in
"difficulty in coming to conclusions and a disturbed capacity for clear thinking." Id.
85. E.g., Redzepi & Lane, supra note 63, at 35. A related defense is "denying the
feeling of entitlement," whereby the envying person "will argue that it was simply not
meant for them to have what is desired or that they do not actually deserve it." Id. at 36.
86. E.g., KLEIN, supra note 77, at 219; Redzepi & Lane, supra note 63, at 36. See also
FERNANDEZ DE LA MORA, supra note 69, at 75 (1987) (arguing that the envier may
pretend "to ignore the goods, the position, or the qualities of the envied person").
87. KLEIN, supra note 77, at 218.
88. Redzepi & Lane, supra note 63, at 36.
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when an envying person responds by "counting [her] blessings,"
admitting that another possesses valued attributes, but coping with

this reality by identifying her own.89
(2) Jealousy

Both theory and empirical work suggest that the most common
reaction to jealousy is "anxiety, distrust, and fear of rejection or
loss."90 Individuals approach their own jealousy with less shame than
they would envy: "jealousy tends to produce justified anger, whereas
envy tends to produce unsanctioned ill will." 91 Theorists often

identify jealousy as a more potent emotion than envy, 92 with some

scholarship confirming the hypothesis that jealousy often actually
'93
includes envy as well as "other distressing elements.
Given the interrelationship between the two emotions, the

similarity in typical defensive reactions to envy and jealousy is not
surprising. For example, as in studies of envy, empirical psychological

research has identified degrading the object of jealousy and soliciting
anger in others as common reactions to jealous feelings. 94 Jealousy,
however, is more likely than envy to result in suspiciousness, feelings
of rejection, hostility, and fear of loss.
Psychologists have
documented jealousy's considerable effect on self-esteem. 95
89. Id. at 37.
90. Parrott & Smith, supra note 63, at 917. See generally Martin P. East & Fraser N.
Watts, Jealousy and Envy, in HANDBOOK OF COGNITION AND EMOTION 569, 569-70
(1999) (noting that "depression, anxiety, and anger" are the most often mentioned
emotions in relation to jealousy); Robert G. Bringle et al., An Analysis of Situation and
Person Components of Jealousy, 17 J. RES. IN PERSONALITY 354, 357 (1983) (observing
that reaction to a "jealousy-evoking event includes affective, cognitive (e.g., attributional),
and behavioral responses").
91. Parrott & Smith, supra note 63, at 917.
92. Id. at 907 (reporting that "[p]revious research has found that jealousy is often more
intense than envy").
93. Peter Salovey & Judith Rodin, The Differentiation of Social-ComparisonJealousy
and Romantic Jealousy, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1100, 1111 (1986) (arguing
that the envy-like emotion of social-comparison jealousy is a subpart of "romantic
jealousy"); Richard H. Smith et al., Envy and Jealousy: Semantic Problems and
Experiential Distinctions, 14 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 401, 407 (1988)
(explaining data showing that individuals use the term "jealousy" to describe both jealous
and envious feelings, but use "envy" to describe only envious feelings).
94. Frederick C. Miner, Jr., Ph.D., Jealousy on the Job, 69 PERSONNEL J. 89, 93 (1990)
(reporting that, in a workplace study, jealous people solicited anger in coworkers in 72%
of incidents and tried to undermine the object of jealousy 36% of the time).
95. E.g., Laura K. Guerrero & Walid A. Afifi, Communicative Responses to Jealousy
as a Function of Self-Esteem and Relationship Maintenance Goals: A Test of Bryson's
Dual Motivation Model, 11 COMM. REP. 111, 111 (1998) (reporting on research that
illustrates that jealous individuals face several communication challenges, "including the
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(3) Constructiveand Destructive Consequences of Envy and Jealousy

Analysts differ on whether jealousy and envy have redeeming
qualities. Some believe the sentiments are entirely destructive,
arguing that they are irrational and pursue no other serviceable end
than to attack what is valuable in others. 96 Others see these
characteristics as exposing the most malignant consequence of
jealousy and envy-the process of directing "hate and destruction"
toward "what is seen as good, not as bad. '97 Still other thinkers
observe that the emotions' fixation on comparison between people
corrodes the self-image of the envier, distracts her from constructive98
endeavors, or interferes with her ability for positive social discourse.
Psychologists highlight a number of negative qualities accompanying
envy: anger, 99 aggressiveness, 1°° isolation, 10 1 and a desire to destroy
°2
and rob the object of envy of the coveted quality or possession.

need to reduce threats to their self-esteem and their relationships"); Laura K. Guerrero &

Walid A. Afifi, Toward a Goal-Oriented Approach for Understanding Communicative
Responses to Jealousy, 63 W. J. OF COMM. 216, 223 (1999) (explaining that the association
between jealousy and lower self-esteem derives from the concept of social comparison);

Shirley A. Staske, Creating Relational Ties in Talk; The Collaborative Construction of
RelationalJealousy, 22 SYMBOLIC INTERACrION 213, 214 (1999) (reporting that clinical
psychology studies link relational jealousy to "low self-esteem"); Jeff B. Bryson, Modes of
Response to Jealousy-Evoking Situations,in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JEALOUSY AND ENVY
176, 198-205 (Peter Salovey ed., 1991) (analyzing the effect of responses to jealousy on
self-esteem); but cf. East & Watts, supra note 90, at 580 (arguing that "[a]lthough people
who are experiencing jealousy may appear to have low self-esteem, the causal direction is
ambiguous.").
96. E.g., R. Horacio Etchegoyen et al., On Envy and How to Interpret It, 68 INT'L J.
PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 49, 50 (1987) (characterizing envy as an irrational phenomenon in that
it pursues no end other than to attack what is valuable in others).
97. MELVIN R. LANSKY, Envy as Process, in THE WIDENING SCOPE OF SHAME 327,
327 (1997); DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE vol. II, at 90 ("[Envy is] joy
at the sufferings and miseries of others, even when they do not cause us offense or
harm.").
98. Eliahu Feldman & Heitor de Paola, An Investigation into the Psychoanalytic
Concept of Envy, 75 INT'L J. PSYCHOL. ANALYSIS 217, 224 (1994) (reporting on the view
that envy is responsible for feelings of "humiliation and smallness" on the part of the
envier); KLEIN, supra note 77, at 204 (arguing that a very envious person is insatiable
because the envy comes from within and that this lack of satisfaction reinforces the envy);
Redzepi & Lane, supra note 63, at 38-39 (citing "how society is plagued by constant
comparisons" and noting the negative effect of envy on children's ability to learn).
99. KLEIN, supra note 77, at 181 ("Envy is the angry feeling that another person
possesses and enjoys something desirable."); Bers & Rodin, supra note 62, at 775
(outlining data demonstrating that thoughts about jealous behavior increase as "more
anger [is] expressed").
100. Redzepi & Lane, supra note 63, at 29-33 (while jealousy is passive, "envy
aggressively and steadily pursues what belongs to others").
101. BORIS, supranote 77, at xv. Boris describes envy's isolating quality as follows:
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Particularly strident disdain comes from a modern political
philosopher, Gonzalo Fernandez de la Mora, who declares that "envy
does not perform one single useful function" and describes the
emotion as "a general, deep, sterile pain.., suffered on account of
mental myopia.' 01 3 While my research reveals that Fernandez de la
Mora has few contemporaries with a similar focus on envy, centuries
of earlier political thinkers shared both his concern with and
unqualified condemnation of envy. Aristotle, for example, describes
envy as "bad" in itselP04 and "evil. ' 10 5 Cicero likewise found no use

for envy, reasoning that the emotion reflected "downright aberration
of mind.

' 10 6

From the medieval period, Thomas Aquinas condemned

envy as "a capital sin," which is "bad always" 107 and philosopher
Ramon Lull observed that "vices multiply in men through envy. ' 10 8
Later thinkers such as Baruch Spinoza also share the view that
"envy... is evil." 109 Likewise, Immanuel Kant considers envy to be
"awful," since it "tortures those who suffer it and aims at destroying

Precisely because envy is so often one sided and isolating, it carries with it a
particular sort of misery. Not only do we feel deficient and defective and filled
with hate but in our aloneness, by our aloneness, we feel diminished, even
humiliated. Others, by comparison, seem comfortably above the fray-and this
punished supposition adds insult to our injury and exacerbates our pain ... it is
as if we are judged and found wanting.
Id. Commentators have identified a characteristic that potentially exacerbates the
isolation of envy: envy, they observe, is less socially acceptable than jealousy. E.g.,
Parrott & Smith, supra note 63, at 907 ("Envious hostility is rarely socially sanctioned,
whereas jealous hostility has usually been accorded greater legitimacy."). For that reason,
the sentiment is more likely to fester within an individual, unchecked by the therapy of
disclosure and human empathy.
102. Claire Allphin, Envy in the Transference and Countertransference, 10 CLINICAL
SOC. WORK J.151, 152 (1982) (arguing that anger associated with envy is so intense that
envier may want to take away the coveted item from the envied party). I do not suggest
that these reactions are unknown in the context of jealousy. Parrott & Smith, supra note
63, at 907 (observing that both envy and jealousy "can involve some form of hostility (envy
may produce resentment and rancor; jealousy may produce anger over betrayal)").
103. FERNANDEZ DE LA MORA, supra note 69, at 127.
104. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS II, at vi, 18, 97 (T.E. Page et al. eds., H.

Rackham trans., The Loeb Classical Library 1934).
105. Id.
106. CICERO, supra note 68, at xxvi, 57, 391.
107. Aquinas, supra note 70, at 568-69 11-2, Q.36, a.3, a.4, r.1.
108. RAMON LULL, CONTEMPLACION CXLVI 8, cited in FERNANDEZ DE LA MORA,

supra note 69, at 31. Ramon Lull highlights envy's place among the "seven deadly sins."
RAMON LULL, THE ART OF CONTEMPLATION 113 (E. Allison Peers trans., 1925) (listing

gluttony, lust, covetousness, sloth, pride, envy, and anger).
109. Benedict De Spinoza, Ethics, in 31 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 355,

438 (Robert Maynard Hutchins et al. eds., W. H. White trans., Encyclopedia Britannica,
Inc. 1952).
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the happiness of others."" 0 Frederich Nietzsche also marshals
disdainful descriptions of jealousy, declaring that "jealousy is a
terrible thing" and that "[h]e whom the flames of jealousy surround at
last turns his poisoned sting against himself, like the scorpion.""'
Other thinkers are more ambivalent, taking an instrumental
12
approach to identify positive consequences of envy and jealousy.
Some psychologists note that a common positive consequence is selfknowledge gained when an individual recognizes her differences from

the object of her envy. This can lead to sharing with others, an
appreciation of one's own attributes, and differentiation between self
and other." 3 Under this view, the self-awareness derived from envy
can help identify goals and focus effort. Particularly where the
individual experiencing envy or jealousy can suppress any desire to
destroy the coveted object, the emotions can prompt virtuous
emulation" 4 or other types of initiative."l 5 Indeed, one scholar notes
that the word "jealousy" shares the same Greek stem as zeal "and
was originally used... until the eighteenth century... almost
interchangeably with that more enthusiastic term."" 6 One theorist
even suggests that envy can promote civilization, creativity, and a
7
domestication of power."
110. Immanuel Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue, in 2 Tim METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 115,
128 (John R. Sylber ed., Mary J. Gregor trans., University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964).
111. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA 64 (R.J. Hollingdale trans.,
1969).
112. E.g., PETER N. STEARNS, JEALOUSY: THE EVOLUTION OF AN EMOTION IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 1 (1989) ("[Jealousy] has some utility, properly targeted, precisely
because it can be painful.").
113. Redzepi & Lane, supra note 63, at 38-40 (reviewing literature on constructive
aspects of envy); V. Smith & M. Whitfield, The Constructive Use of Envy, 28 CANADIAN !.
OF PSYCHIATRY 14,14-17 (1983).
114. FERNANDEZ DE LA MORA, supra note 69, at 47 (citing PAUL HEINRICH
HOLBACH, I LA MORALE UNIVERSALLE 1, 5 (1776)).
115. Seid, supra note 63, at 42 (arguing that "[e]nvy indeed breeds a healthy, productive
competition and can spur us to better ourselves"); S. Frankel & I. Sherick, Observations
on the Development of Normal Envy, 32 THE PSYCHOANALYTICAL STUDY OF THE CHILD
257, 279 (1977) (noting that envy holds a place in normal development by the progressive
refinement of the subject of the envious wish).
This focus on consequential benefits may point out a nomenclature difference
between those who brand envy and jealousy as evil and those who see the emotions as
prompting beneficial acts. Indeed, Aristotle-who saw only evil in what he denominated
envy-listed as a virtue the human quality of "ambition" because it promotes improved
skill through incentive and practice. Staten, supra note 4, at 68-69.
116. STEARNS, supranote 112, at 1.
117. Allphin, supra note 102, at 155 (noting positive aspects of envy, such as promoting
civilization, creativity, and the domestication of power). This comports with the Freudian
view that envy prompts sociability. FERNANDEZ DE LA MORA, supra note 69, at 83.
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Generally, theorists see positive consequences of envy and
jealousy not because of any inherent goodness in the emotions, but
because they serve as catalysts for positive character development.
The transformations, however, do not uniformly or predictably track
the path from negative to positive. Sometimes the jealous or envious
individual is better at "sour grapes" than she is at "sweet lemons."11 8
The alchemy by which a person tries to change dysfunctional
emotions into productive ones can sometimes tempt her into
deceiving of herself, others, or both. 119
(4) Coping Strategies
(a) Strategies for Individuals
Psychological studies of coping strategies have found that success
varies according to the context and degree of jealous or envious
emotion experienced. In one study, "self-reliance" - which includes
"emotional control, perseverance, and tenacity" -acted as the most
common response to lower levels of envy and jealousy. 120 Other
(defined as
defense reactions studied included "self-bolstering"
"thinking about one's good qualities, doing nice things for oneself,
thinking positively about oneself") and "selective ignoring" (defined
as "reevaluating the importance of the desired goal"). 121 Like selfreliance, selective ignoring provides a useful technique in reducing
the initial flash of envy and jealousy. Self-reliance and selective
ignoring do not draw on thoughts about oneself, but rather focus on
the stimulus for jealousy and envy. These devices prompt the
individual either to become "more committed to attaining [her] goals,
trying harder and avoiding emotional outbursts," or to conclude that
1 22
goals are no longer worth the struggle.
By contrast, self-bolstering does not prove useful in coping with
initial, low-level response, since an initial jealous or envious response
generates "such powerful, negative, self-relevant imagery.1 123 Selfbolstering becomes most useful in assisting individuals whose

118. Simon Blackburn, Why do we need to feel?, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Oct.
29, 1999, at 3 (reviewing ELSTER, supra note 74, and JON ELSTER, STRONG FEELINGS:
EMOTION, ADDITION, AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1999)).

119. Id.
120. Peter Salovey & Judith Rodin, Coping with Envy and Jealousy, 7 J. SOC. &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 15, 23 (1988).
121. Id.

122. Id. at 28-29.
123. Id. at 28.
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repeated exposure to situations producing envy and jealousy cause
them to experience anger, sadness, or depression.124 The strategy of
self-bolstering is akin to the defense of "counting one's blessings,"
described above as occurring without prompting in some
individuals.1 5
Psychologists argue that identifying the origin of envy is crucial
to identifying coping strategies. For example, envy can arise because
the envied person symbolizes an obstacle that the envier has
1 26
experienced in achieving a "desired or important goal.
Understanding that the obstacle is independent of the envied can help
the envier identify the source of her frustration and take appropriate
action to eliminate the frustration. Similarly, envy may result because
the envied person has not encountered an injustice that has hurt the
envier or caused the envier to feel inferior. 27 Again, understanding
that the injustice, not the envied person, causes the anger assists the
envier to channel her efforts more constructively.
Political theorist Gonzalo Fernandez de la Mora expounds a
number of prescriptions for overcoming and suppressing envy. Some
overlap with psychologists' solutions. Fernandez de la Mora explains
that when one confronts the possibility that another may enjoy
superior happiness, three potential reactions become options: to
strive to achieve whatever that superior happiness involves; to accept
one's happiness as inferior; or to hope that the other loses the
happiness they possess. It is only the third, suggests Fernandez de la
Mora, that amounts to the destructive sentiment of envy. Fernandez
de la Mora argues that, to avoid the envy trap, individuals may strive
to achieve more by emulating the envied, overcoming the
superiorities enjoyed by the envied by developing alternative
superiorities, or fostering "happiness at what is valuable even if it
belongs to others, a feeling of solidarity with the whole species, and
sympathy." 28 These latter concepts of value, solidarity, and
sympathy stem from the premise that "[s]uperior humans are
normally the most creative, and every human creation is a common
good, for it enriches the patrimony of humanity.' 1 29 Under this
reasoning, "[a] reasonable 'selfishness' forces us to value the most
124. Id. at 29-30. See also BORIS, supra note 77, at 153 (arguing that "[t]o be envied is
the best anodyne for envy").
125. Supra note 121 for further discussion of this defensive response to envy.
126. East & Watts, supra note 90, at 583.
127. Id.
128. FERNANDEZ DE LA MORA, supra note 69, at 120-21.
129. Id. at 126.
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gifted."'130 Particularly useful to this article, however, is his notion of
developing alternative superiorities -which focuses on "vocational
specialization.' 131 This specialization, Fernandez de la Mora argues,
"compensates for inferiorities with the superiority of our chosen and
'132
mastered activity according to the ideal of the work well done.
(b) Strategies for Groups and Organizations
Management specialists developed strategies for coping with
envy in groups by using organizational framework to manipulate
individual emotional response. The most pertinent techniques are
structural devices designed to encapsulate groups. 133 Through
encapsulation, organizations create distinct social units, with each unit
enjoying its own rights, privileges, and responsibilities.
The
organization delineates each unit with tangible and intangible
boundaries, such as segregated dining areas, club memberships, or
cultural prohibitions such as "don't fraternize with the troops. '134 By
reducing interaction between individuals of unequal status and
minimizing relative differences within a particular unit, the
boundaries ensure that unit members may "freely enjoy their material
'135
successes without feeling vulnerable to the latent envy of others.
In essence, this management approach exploits the observation made
by thinkers across disciplines 36 that envy and jealousy most
commonly arise among those that are close in proximity and status.
By ensuring that those who are close to each other enjoy equal
benefits, the strategy minimizes the possibility that one peer has
something the other does not or that one peer has an incentive to take
something from another.
Critically viewed, however, this encapsulation strategy creates
barriers and constricting divisions among the necessary players in an
organization. In fact, the strategy is strikingly analogous to the strict
hierarchy characterizing unpopular governmental structures such as
monarchy.
Interestingly, ancient Greek writers made similar
observations, noting that the monarchical structure tends to reduce
envy among subjects and that a monarch can prevent his subjects

130. Id. at 127.
131. Id. at 126-27.
132. Id. at 126.
133. Bedeian, supra note 77, at 52.
134. Id. at 53.
135. Id.
136. Supra note 70-76 for discussion of the observation that envy and jealousy arise
most often among those who are close in proximity and status.
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down" or increasing "the
from envying him by "keeping them 37
subjects.'
his
and
[him]
distance between
In response to criticism of the encapsulation theory, some
management theories propound an alternative approach by which an
organization seeks to foster a feeling of partnership among its diverse
members. 138 The problem, however, is that the resulting breakdown
of barriers ushers in expectations of equality, which in turn create
fertile ground for envy. An analogy to governmental theory is
Alexis de Tocqueville noted that, in American
instructive.
absence of legal barriers to wealth and power
the
democracy,
139
facilitate envy.

Portions of Fernandez de la Mora's writings-which highlight
antidotes to envy such as fostering sympathy and solidarity among
140
Homo sapiens-respond to this tension between equality and envy.
Attempting a balance that encourages partnership but simultaneously
discourages envy, Fernandez de la Mora theorizes that "equality"
among humans is a false and destructive construct that undermines
individuals' ability to contribute their best to a mutual rewarding
society. To address this concern, he prescribes individual strategies to
overcome envy as part of his larger concerns with governmental
design and public policy.
C. Interdisciplinary Concerns
Before moving on to evaluate judicial opinions, I pause to
consider the limitations of the social science literature just outlined.
This project implicates a perennial issue with interdisciplinary
analysis: whether application of psychology, sociology, philosophy,
and political science literature to the legal setting stretches the works
beyond the context for which they were designed. One particular
problem that arises here involves the distinction between individual
experiences with envy and jealousy and group dynamics resulting
137. ELSTER, supra note 74, at 182-83 (summarizing the writings of Isocrates, Plutarch,
and Herodotus).
138. Bedeian, supra note 77, at 53 (describing corporate experiments designed to
reduce management/labor envy).
139. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 39, at 33 (Richard D. Heffner ed., 1956) (arguing that
"[t]he division of property has lessened the distance which separated the rich from the
poor; but it would seem that the nearer they draw to each other, the greater is their mutual
hatred, and the more vehement the envy and the dread with which they resist each other's
claims to power").
140. FERNANDEZ DE LA MoRA, supra note 69, at 122-24; supra notes 128-32 for
detailed descriptions of Fernandez de la Mora's prescriptions for overcoming and
suppressing envy.
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where these emotions are present. The two contexts are not
necessarily fungible. Thus, for example, psychology's emphasis on
individual emotions may shed limited light on the decisionmaking
process of a collective body such as "the judiciary," "the legislature,"
or "the executive." The broad brushes of organizational theory may
likewise reveal little about an insular nine-member appellate court,
such as the United States Supreme Court.
These limitations reflect a specific example of what Professor
1 41
James S. Coleman coins the "micro-to-macro transition" problem.
In light of transition difficulties, Coleman counsels against
simplistically analyzing the operation of a system merely by
aggregating the consequences of the emotions and values of the
individuals who compose the system. Interestingly, the problems
Coleman identifies surrounding transferring insights about individuals
into governmental theory are not confined to contemporary
interdisciplinary projects. Indeed, even the FederalistPapers did not
identify the distinction between control of individual passions by
harnessing conflicting passions within an individual and control of
individual passions by encouraging countervailing passions or
incentives in competing branches of government. So, for example,
confusion exists about whether Federalist 51's admonition that
"ambition must be made to counteract ambition" 42 referred
exclusively to a governmental system of separation of powers or,
instead, to the individual psychology of a governmental actor with
143
contradictory passions that cancel each other out.
One prescription for the micro-to-macro transition problem
would be, of course, to avoid interdisciplinary work. To benefit from
the deep understanding of envy and jealousy in other disciplines, I
have chosen instead to remain mindful of the potential problem and
to flag analytical jumps between the individual and the collective.
When such jumps take place, I have sought to use social science
findings metaphorically rather than literally 44 When possible, I have
141. JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 6-21 (1990) (describing
the micro-to-macro problem in social theory).
142. Madison, FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 2, at 160.
143. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 3,at 29-30 (comparing Federalist5 and Federalist 72 and
arguing that they interchanged the "comparatively novel thought of checks and balances"
and the principle of passions "fighting it out within a single soul").
144. A related complication arises from the fact that the phenomenon I analyze here,
judicial review, arises within the context of dynamic relationships among the three
branches of the federal government as well as the relationships between federal and state
actors. Any actions taken to remedy problems of jealousy and envy felt by the federal
judicial branch could have repercussions for the federal branches as well as state
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sought to integrate my analysis of the individual and the collective,
responding to the insight that social emotions such as jealousy and
envy are "shaped by the social context in which they arise."'145
Finally, I do note one promising observation reflecting favorably on
using diverse material on jealousy and envy: the remarkable overlap
in ideas among the different disciplines, irrespective of whether the

philosopher, political scientist, or psychologist confronted a collective
or individual phenomenon.
I. Envy and Jealousy in Judicial Opinions
Many contemporary materials show highly charged responses to
interbranch relationships. For example, in commenting on the threat
that the Supreme Court may invalidate the Violence Against Women
Act, 146 Senator Joe Biden rhetorically proclaimed "Who the hell are

they not to agree?"' 147 Representative Henry Hyde showed similar
disgust in the context of intrabranch relations, accusing the Senate of
withholding proper respect to the "blue-collar people" in the House
148

during the impeachment proceedings against President Clinton.

government itself. A complete analysis of the jealousy and envy problem would therefore
properly include consideration of jealousy and envy likely felt by these other
governmental departments. Such an analysis would multiply the present effort threefold
and, in fact, may be impossible to perform with any accuracy. Cf.JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS:
MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 144-45 (1987) (noting that scientists maintain that the
relationships among three bodies in a system are "most often impossible" to track). I
therefore decline to undertake that analysis and note that fact as a limitation of this study.
Similarly, I have steered clear of analysis of how the people may experience envy of
representatives of government. For an interesting discussion of how this envy manifests in
mediocre representatives who receive low pay, see TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 39, at 256263.
145. ELSTER, supra note 74, at 203. See, e.g., East & Watts, supra note 90, at 569-70
(observing that jealousy and envy are inextricable from the social context in which they
occur).
146. Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40001-40703, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902-55.
147. Morning Edition: Supreme Court to Hear Case About Constitutionalityof Violence
Against Women Act (NPR radio broadcast, Jan. 11, 2000). Senator Biden analogized the
Rehnquist Court to the 1930's Supreme Court that systematically struck down New Deal
legislation. Id.
148. Morning Edition: Impeachment Trial Enters Critical Phase as House Managers
Deliver Motions for Witnesses (NPR radio broadcast, Jan. 26, 1999). See also Weekend
Edition: Overview of the Week's News (NPR radio broadcast, Feb. 6, 1999) (commentator
Daniel Schorr stated that "Chairman Hyde was declaring a class war between the bluecollar House and the elitist Senate.").
The impeachment process is a classic example of how the checks and balances system
works at cross purposes. Indeed, the impeachment process provides the perfect
opportunity for an envious segment of the government to make another segment look bad.
Cass R. Sunstein, Impeaching the President, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 279, 314 (1998) ("[lIt is
clear that the Framers feared that impeachment could be used as a political tool, and
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Spurred by these examples from the popular press, I performed a
content review of many pages of formal legislative and executive

materials dealing with separation of powers questions, but ultimately
149
uncovered little meaningful evidence of jealousy and envy.
Perhaps I should not be surprised with having come up dry. The
formal context of briefs, legislative hearings, and debates do not lend
themselves to outpouring of emotion.
Moreover, given the
admonitions of psychologists and political philosophers, I should not
be shocked that my search did not bear "mountains of fruit." Envy
and jealousy are emotions not likely revealed. Many thinkers
maintain that envy in particular is a sentiment people strive hard to
conceal. 150 With characteristic storm clouds, Arthur Schopenhauer

describes the phenomenon as follows: the envier "hides as carefully
as the secret, lustful sinner and becomes the endless inventor of tricks
and stratagems to hide and mask himself." 151
The envier,
Schopenhauer maintains, works "to ignore the superiority of others
which eats up his heart... [and] to prevent any form of superiority

from appearing in any situation. 1'

52

A common way for the envier to

achieve this denial, as noted above, is silence. 153
In more
contemporary work, Jon Elster observes that envy is sometimes
transmuted into "a more acceptable emotion, such as righteous anger
'154
or righteous indignation.
Scholarship does not similarly condemn jealousy. Particularly

telling is the list of seven deadly sins, which includes envy, but omits

sought to ensure a standard that would insulate the President from impeachments that
were driven by factions, passions, or parochial interests.").
149. Together with four research assistants, I reviewed the legislative materials relevant
to and the briefs written in connection with the following cases implicating separation of
powers issues: Fla. Prepaidv. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Clinton v. New
York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); Boerne v. Flores,521 U.S. 507 (1997); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,
Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1994); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989); Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); INS v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919
(1983); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976). I chose this cross-section as representing
the various ways in which one of the three branches could encroach on another branch.
150. E.g., FERNANDEZ DE LA MORA, supra note 69, at 73 (arguing that envy is the
"dark, hidden, eternally masked sin"); Blackburn, supra note 118, at 3 (noting deceptive
techniques used to veil shameful emotions such as envy).
151. ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, On Human Nature, in ESSAYS FROM THE PARERGA
AND PARALIPOMENA 5, 21 (T. Bailey Saunders trans., George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1951).
152. Id.
153. FERNANDEZ DE LA MORA, supra note 69, at 75 (arguing that the "most passive
and cautious technique" for an envier coping with the emotion is "silence," where the
envious "pretends to ignore the good, the position, or the qualities of the envied person").
154. ELSTER, supra note 74, at 165.
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jealousy. 55 Thinkers as diverse as philosophers and authors of fiction
have evinced greater pathos for jealousy than envy. For example, the
French moralist La Rochefoucauld asserts: "Jealousy is, to some
extent, fitting and reasonable, since it tends merely to preserve the
property that belongs to us or that we believe belongs to us, whereas
' 56
envy is a rage which cannot bear that others should own property.'
Despite this occasional sympathetic treatment of the emotion,
a
jealousy is not usually a point of pride and has been branded as1 57
"bad" emotion caused by "personal defects of the jealous person.'
Thus, like envy, jealousy is not an emotion readily disclosed,
particularly in formal documents.
Given this propensity to silence, one is struck by the apparent
envy and jealousy in judicial opinions when judicial power hangs in
the balance. Like legislative hearings, floor debates, and appellate
briefs, judicial opinions are not a medium generally thought suited to
emotional outpouring by their authors. 158 Yet I found a series of
relatively dramatic examples from Supreme Court decisions in the
1990's as well as a smattering of earlier decisions.
My thesis that these opinions evince jealousy and envy rests on a
First, the opinions reveal qualities that
number of factors.
psychologists and other thinkers have identified as common reactions
or coping responses to jealousy and envy. Some even show what
psychologists have identified as the communicative flags for jealousy:
"emotion terms, emotion metaphors or metonymies (behavioral or
physiological reactions assoiated with a particular emotional state
which can be used to represent that emotion).' 159 Second, the
opinions emerge from an organizational structure reflecting
characteristics that centuries of thinkers have identified as tending to
155. LLOYD, supra note 64, at 3 (making this observation about the list of seven deadly
sins).
156. FRANCOIS DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULD, MAXIMS 38 (L. Kronenberger trans., 1959).
See also LLOYD, supra note 64, at 3-4 (discussing literary treatments of the distinction
between envy and jealousy).
157. Staske, supra note 95, at 214 (reporting that relational jealousy implicates "serious
and clearly pejorative characteristics" of those experiencing the emotion).
158. See Laura E. Little, Hiding With Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal
Jurisdiction Opinions, 46 UCLA L. RnV. 75, 82-87 (1998) (discussing the tendency of
judicial opinion writers to use language of formalism and to avoid full candor). Perhaps
exacerbating the judiciary's precarious position in the allocation of powers among the
branches of the federal government is the tradition of requiring the judiciary to explain or
justify their exercise of power. Seidman, supra note 55, at 1574 (explaining how opinion
writing tradition exposes the judicial thought process and enables criticism of the
proffered justifications for a decision).
159. Staske, supra note 95, at 216.
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Also important is the
produce jealous and envious emotions.
intuition that powerful individuals such as federal judges are capable
of falling prey to envy and jealousy toward others who purport to also
exercise significant power within the same enterprise.
Having concluded that the opinions evince judicial jealousy and
envy, I have a number of reasons to be circumspect in my assertions.
First, the stigma associated with jealousy and envy suggests that the
opinions contain only clues of concealed intent. Even if the opinions
were not filtered through the efforts of law clerks and the collective
decisionmaking process, one cannot declare decisively what judicial
emotions lurk behind word choices.1 60 Moreover, although emotional
attitudes are clearly present in the opinions, the emotions are also
subject to interpretation: what may appear to be envy and jealousy
could also be related, but not identical, emotions such as pride,
arrogance, and ambition.
With these important qualifications, I note that the evidence of
jealousy and envy comes in two basic forms. First, opinions tend to
The
devalue the object of judicial envy (usually Congress).
deprecating words either disparage the other branch's power and
abilities or magnify that branch's negative attributes. Evidence also
comes in the form of self-bolstering- extravagantly boastful
statements about the depth and breadth of judicial power. Although
I uncovered most examples of these strategies from a series of
Supreme Court cases in the 1990's, older opinions reveal similar
attitudes and coping devices.
An early example of both judicial self-aggrandizement and
deprecation of Congress is Justice Story's opinion for the Court in
Known as one of the first
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee.t61
of
Supreme
Court
power to review state court
pronouncements
162
decisions, Justice Story's opinion also asserts a controversial thesis
that Congress was constitutionally compelled to create lower federal
courts to hear at least some claims. 63 He reaches this conclusion
through self-championing rhetoric, describing Article III as "the voice
160. See generally Little, supra note 158, at 120-29 (discussing sociology and traditions
of Supreme Court opinion writing).
161. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1819).
162. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION (3d ed. 1999).

163. Compare Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III:Separating the
Two Tiers of FederalJurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REv. 205, 214-15 (1985) (agreeing with at

least some of Justice Story's argument), with John Harrison, The Power of Congress to
Limit the Jurisdictionof FederalCourts and the Text of Article Il,64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203.

206-12 (1997) (critiquing Justice Story's argument that Article III commands Congress to
"vest the judicial power" in lower courts).
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of the whole American people solemnly declared, in establishing one
great department of that government which was, in many respects,
national, and in all, supreme." Article III, he maintains, makes clear
Congress' subservient duty to preserve judicial power: "The language
of the article throughout is manifestly designed to be mandatory upon
the legislature. Its obligatory force is so imperative, that Congress
could not, without a violation of its duty, have refused to carry it into
operation."'164
A later example with similar judicial self-inflation is Cooper v.
Aaron,165 in which the Supreme Court asserted that its constitutional
interpretations bind all officials, and that the obligation of nonjudicial
officers to obey the Constitution is an obligation to obey the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution. Cooper
observed that the principle that "the federal judiciary is supreme in
permanent and
the exposition of the law of the Constitution" and1"a
66
indispensable feature of our constitutional system."'
Although Cooper and Martin v. Hunter's Lessee reflect judicial
self-bolstering when supreme constitutional review hangs in the
balance, the Court has shown a similarly protectionist view of judicial
power where judgments in statutory cases are at issue. For example,
in Hayburn's Case,167 several justices declared that "[r]evision and
control" of Article III judgments is "radically inconsistent with the
68
independence of that judicial power which is vested in the courts.'
Two other judges added, "[n]o decision of any court of the United
States can, under any circumstances,... be liable to a revision, or

even suspension, by the legislature itself, in whom no judicial power
of any kind appears to be vested."' 169 In a similar, more recent
context, the Court in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. 70 invalidated
Congress' attempt to undermine a judicially created limitative period
for claims alleging violations of federal securities statutes. The Plaut
Court grandiosely proclaimed:

164. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304,328 (1819).
165. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
166. Id at 18. The Cooper Court further reasoned that, where an official acts contrary
to a federal judicial interpretation of the Constitution, the official is not only at "war
against the Constitution," but is also "violating his undertaking to support it." Id
Cooper's conception of supreme judicial interpretative power also appears in United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,704 (1974), and Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,549 (1969).
167. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792).
168. Id. at 411 (opinion of Wilson and Blair, JJ. and Peters, DJ.)
169. Id. at 413 (opinion of Iredell, J., and Sitgreaves, DJ.).
170. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
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the Framers crafted this charter of the judicial department with an
expressed understanding that it gives the federal judiciary the

power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them, subject to
review only by superior courts in the Article III hierarchy-with an
understanding, in short, that a judgment conclusively resolves the
case because
a judicial Power is one to render dispositive
1 71

judgments.

Both strains of self-inflation and belittlement of Congress are
present in City of Boerne v. Flores,172 which is perhaps the most
illustrious example of modern judicial envy and jealousy. Striking
down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as beyond Congress'
enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment's section 5,
the Boerne Court cited the Fourteenth Amendment drafters' desire to
ensure that Congress not receive "too much legislative power at the
expense of the existing constitutional structure." 173 Under the
auspices of this intent, Boerne created a two-part pincer device:
jealously guarding the exclusivity of supreme constitutional review
and enviously delimiting Congress' law-declaring capacities under
section 5 (which happens to be that portion of the Fourteenth
Amendment that singles out Congress as the branch responsible for
making the Amendment meaningful). Invoking its own apparently
superior ability to interpret the Constitution accurately and
consistently, the Court asserted: "If Congress could define its own
powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning," the
Constitution would be "on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and,
like other acts,... alterable" at the whim of "[s]hifting legislative
majorities. ' 174 The Court chastised Congress for failing to respect the
judiciary's superior power and abilities and condemned the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act's contradiction of an earlier judicial
decision as dangerous indeed:
Our national experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved

best when each part of the Government respects both the
Constitution and the proper actions and determinations of the
other branches. When the Court has interpreted the Constitution,
it has acted within the province of the Judicial Branch, which
171. Id. at 218-19 (1995) (internal quotation marks and emphasis deleted).
172. 521 U.S. 507.
173. Id. at 520 (citations omitted).
174. Id. at 529 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). Mark
Tushnet explains that the Boerne Court applied a double standard. TUSHNET, supra note
7, at 26 ("If members of Congress have an incentive to maximize the sphere of their power
and responsibilities, so do Supreme Court justices with respect to their sphere.").
According to Tushnet, Boerne's approach to judicial review, however, allows the Court,
not Congress, to exercise "its power-maximizing capacity." Id.
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embraces the duty to say what the law is .... When the political
branches of the Government act against the background of a
judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be
understood that in later cases and controversies
the Court will treat
175
its precedents with the respect due them ....

With a vengeance, the Court has applied Boerne's scorn of
Fourteenth Amendment legislation. 76 For example, the Court
recently declared in a case construing the Patent Remedy Act that
"Congress barely considered the availability of state remedies" and
that "the record at best offers scant support for Congress' conclusion
that States were depriving patent owners of property without due
process of law.' 77 Similar critical rhetoric appears in the Court's
condemnation of Congress' attempt to apply the Age Discrimination
Act to the states: "Congress had virtually no reason to believe that
state and local governments were unconstitutionally discriminating
78
against their employees on the basis of age.'
Disparaging comments about Congress' failure to do its
homework in justifying legislation is not confined to Fourteenth
Amendment lawmaking.179 Such comments also emerge from the
175. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997) (citations omitted). The Court
echoed these sentiments in its June 2000 confirmation of Miranda. See Dickerson v.
United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000) (emphasizing that "Congress may not
legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution.").
176. Many Court observers have noted the Court's recent aggressiveness. E.g., Linda
Greenhouse, Justices Forceful in Refusing to Defer to Other Branches,THE OREGONIAN,
June 27, 1999 ("The Supreme Court rules. That was the message of a term in which the
Court asserted its power over every branch and level of government, few of which
emerged unchanged from the encounter.").
177. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 643 (1999). "Congress identified no pattern of patent infringement by the states, let
alone a pattern of constitutional violations." Id. (emphasis added); Greenhouse, supra
note 176 (describing the Court's approach in Florida Prepaid as "aggressively far
reaching," taking for itself "a veto power beyond any it has exercised in modem times").
Perhaps tellingly, congressional response to FloridaPrepaidwas swift and also aggressive.
State-Immunity: Draft Bill Would Restore Right to Sue States for Infringement, 68
U.S.L.W., Nov. 2, 1999, at 2254 (describing draft bill designed to "restore to intellectual
property owner the right to bring infringement suits against the states").
178. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 650 (2000) ("Congress's failure to
uncover any significant pattern of unconstitutional discrimination here confirms that
Congress had no reason to believe that broad prophylactic legislation was necessary in this
field.").
179. The Court's aggressive approach to its own institutional turf permeates its recent
decisions. Linda Greenhouse, The Court Rules, America Changes, N.Y. TIMES, July 2,
2000, at 1 ("observing that what animates the justices are questions of the court's
institutional turf in particular and the allocation of governmental power in general, both
among branches of the federal government and between Washington and the states").
The October 1999 Term, for example, evinces this approach in myriad contexts. Kimel,
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Court's new approach to Commerce Clause legislation, where, for
example, the Court sarcastically declared: "[T]o the extent that
congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative
judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate
commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the
naked eye, they are lacking here."'180 Similarly, the Court has
criticized Congress' failure to set uniform policy for guiding
administrative agencies: "we cannot ignore Congress' unwillingness
to adopt a single national policy."' 81 Indeed, the Court recently
described a legislatively created administrative scheme as "so pierced
with exemptions and inconsistencies that the Government cannot
''
hope to exonerate it. 182
Similarly denigrating themes appear in federalism cases, in which
the Court is prone to magnify Congress' apparent inability to legislate
in a manner that stays within the scope of its prerogative and respects
state sovereignty. The following lecture from a recent Eleventh
Amendment decision bears a typical tone:
Congress has vast power but not all power. When Congress
legislates in matters affecting the States, it may not treat these
sovereign entities as mere prefectures or corporations. Congress
must accord States the esteem due to them as joint participants in a
federal system, one beginning with the premise of sovereignty in
both the central Government and the separate States. Congress
has ample means to ensure compliance with valid federal laws, but
183
it must respect the sovereignty of the States.
Jealous guardianship of coveted judicial powers is not limited to
threats directly from Congress.
For example, Justice Scalia,
120 S. Ct. 631 (declaring that Congress overreached its power when it subjected states to
federal age discrimination suits by employees); United States v. Morrison, 120 S.Ct. 1740
(2000) (invalidating a federal statute creating a civil cause of action to redress gendermotivated violence); Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 1858
(2000) (holding that states cannot be sued under the qui tam provisions of the False
Claims Act); Jones v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 1904 (2000) (holding that Congress
overstepped its power by enacting a criminal statute authorizing arson prosecutions);
Dickerson v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 2326 (2000) (declaring federal statute in conflict
with Miranda v. Arizona unconstitutional). But see Reno v. Condon, 120 S.Ct. (2000)
(upholding Congressional power to regulate the privacy of state motor vehicle records);
Miller v. French, 120 S.Ct. 2246 (2000) (finding that Congress acted within its power when
it provided for an automatic stay of injunctive relief issued in prison reform litigation).
180. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995).
181. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 187 (1999).
182. Id. at 190. See also id. at 193-94 ("[Ojne would have thought that Congress might
have at least experimented with comparable regulation before abridging the speech rights
of federally unregulated casinos.")
183. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 758 (1999).
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dissenting from the Court's rejection of a separation of powers
challenge to the United States Sentencing Commission, showed sharp
distaste for the Commission, presumably not because of its
connection to other branches of government, but because the

Commission did not possess a constitutionally derived pedigree.
Indeed, Justice Scalia condemned the Sentencing Commission
because its lawmaking is "entirely unrelated to the exercise of judicial
or executive powers," a state of affairs wholly unsatisfactory "not
because of the scope of the delegated power, but because [the
Commission] is not one of the three Branches of Government."'184
Similarly, the Court's reaction to bankruptcy court power also
revealed a need to protect the special aura of Article III judicial
power. 8 5 Nor has the Court's focus on keeping administrative
entities from exercising judicial power prevented it in recent terms
from showing greater and greater disfavor for administrative
186
agencies' delegated powers and exercise of discretion.

184. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 422 (1989). The protective tone may
derive in part from the suggestions throughout briefs of the petitioner and amici that the
Sentencing Commission robs power from the judiciary. See, e.g., id. at 384 (summarizing
petitioners brief as arguing that the Commission erodes "the integrity and independence
of the Judiciary by requiring Article III judges to sit on the Commission, by requiring that
those judges share their rule-making authority with nonjudges, and by subjecting the
Commission's members to appointment and removal by the President"); Brief of Amici
Curiae, United States, Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (Nos. 87-1904, 877028) (explaining that the Attorney General of the United States had taken the position
that the Sentencing Reform Act could "delegate only to the executive branch, but not to
the judicial branch, the function of formulating general rules such as sentencing
guidelines"); Brief of the United States Senate, Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361
(1989) (Nos. 87-1904, 87-7038) (describing that during the congressional deliberation
process, at least one Senator suggested that judges could participate in, but not control,
"the process of establishing and adjusting the guidelines").
185. North Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 82 (1982)
(plurality opinion) (deciding that Congress vested "adjunct" bankruptcy judges with
"powers that far exceed the powers that it has vested in administrative agencies that
adjudicate only rights of Congress's own creation").
186. E.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000) (holding
that contrary to present agency position, FDA lacks jurisdiction to regulate tobacco);
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2146 (1999) (determining that "[n]o
agency has been delegated authority to interpret the term 'disability"' and that the
"approach adopted by the agency guidelines ... is an impermissible interpretation" of the
statute"). See also Mark Burge, Regulatory Reform and the Chevron Doctrine: Can
Congress Force Better Decisionmaking by Courts?, 75 TEx. L. REV. 1085, 1090 (1997)
(citing possible demise of Chevron deference).
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IV. Ramifications of Envy and Jealousy Literature for Legal
Doctrine and Judicial Review
What lessons does this evidence of judicial jealousy and envy
hold? I structure a response around three core disputes that have
commanded the attention of constitutional analysts for several
decades. First is the question whether prudence and constitutional
structure counsel eliminating or minimizing supreme judicial review.
This debate includes the subsidiary question of how judicial restraint
should manifest: justiciability doctrines, canons of avoidance, or
other techniques. The second debate, which has commanded the
attention of most scholars struggling with the role of judicial review in
our government, concerns which category of constitutional questions
calls for the most searching judicial scrutiny: separation of powers,
federalism, or individual rights questions. Third is a related dispute
about the analytical or doctrinal form most appropriate for questions
of governmental structure-the two prominent competing candidates
being functionalism and formalism. All three disputes include
important systemic arguments about factors only indirectly related to
the ability of the judiciary to perform the requested tasks, such as the
tyranny of majoritarian forces in government. While crucial to the
debates about the existence, scope, and form of judicial review, these
factors do not concern me here. I do not seek to resolve the debates
themselves, but instead confine my enterprise to evaluating how
understanding of envy and jealousy contribute to their resolution.
A. Eliminating or Substantially Constraining All Supreme Judicial Review

A number of scholars maintain that the judiciary should either
forego or substantially reduce its power to interpret the Constitution.
Some argue that the federal judiciary should restrain its power of
review when deciding certain types of issues. Those who make this
topical distinction form the subject of the immediately following
subsection. Here, I focus on those who expound arguments about
judicial restraint for all legal disputes. For this latter group of
scholars, the literature on jealousy and envy brings largely welcome
news.
The news, however, does vary in intensity and detail according to
the scholarly approach. For those intent on resolving the question
whether supreme judicial review should exist, the jealousy and envy
concern adds another brick in their pile, another reason why supreme
judicial review is problematic. For those with more nuanced
arguments focusing on the mode of judicial restraint, the contribution
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of the jealousy and envy literature is more complex. Thus, the latter

part of this section surveys some of the various mechanisms for
judicial deference proposed in the scholarly literature.
(1) Abolishing Supreme JudicialReview
(a) Legal Scholarship

Aside from those concerned with authorizing executive branch
officials to make independent judgments about constitutional
meaning, 187 Mark Tushnet has recently taken the lead in arguing for
eliminating altogether the judiciary's privileged position as final
arbiter of the meaning of the Constitution. Although not enjoying
188
broad contemporary support, the position has a rich lineage.
According to Tushnet, the entire Constitution, individual rights
and all, can be self-enforcing, and the optimum state is to replace
judicial review with "populist constitutional law."'189 Judges, Tushnet
contends, are not good at creating constitutional meaning-they often
don't do it accurately and tend to overdo it.190

In addition, he

concludes, our current system of vigorous judicial review is relatively

187. Michael Stokes Paulsen is often credited with kindling the current debate about
executive power to interpret the Constitution. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most
Dangerous Branch- Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. LJ.217, 343-45
(1994) (arguing that executive officials should not defer to the judiciary's constitutional
decisions that they believe are mistaken). For favorable critiques of this article, see
Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A Response to Professor
Paulsen, 83 GEO. L.J. 347, 348 (1994); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Protestantismin
Theory and Practice: Two Questions for Michael Stokes Paulsenand One for His Critics,
83 GEO. L. J. 373, 373-374 (1994). Other sources are collected in Gary Lawson &
Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of ConstitutionalInterpretation,81 IOWA L.
REV. 1267, 1269 n.4 (1996).
188. The position has substantial ties with those who advocate substantially restricting
supreme judicial review. E.g., LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958) ("For
myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I
know how to choose them, which I assuredly do not."); James B. Thayer, The Origin and
Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 155-56
(1893) (arguing that the "road to reform is that of impressing upon our people a far
stronger sense than they have of the great range of possible harm that our system leaves
open, and must leave open, to the legislatures, and of the clear limits of judicial power").
See also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 668 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (noting that judicial review "is always attended with a serious evil, namely, that
the correction of legislative mistakes comes from the outside, and the people thus lose the
political experience, and the moral education and stimulus that come from fighting the
question out in the ordinary way, and correcting their own errors"). For further discussion
of this minimalist position, see infra notes 203-214and accompanying text.
189. TUSHNET, supra note 7, at 127-28.
190. Id.at 159.
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ineffectual, "operating at the margins of our political life."1 91 On the
other side of the balance, he argues that we would gain much from
abolishing this flawed institution, including an "increase in our power
of self-government" and more "serious thinking about the
Constitution outside the courts. ' 1 92 Tushnet's ultimate system would
include complex "interbranch interaction, in which members in each
branch make their own decisions about what the Constitution
requires.

'193

Tushnet's views clash with the bulk of thinkers who have
addressed the question of judicial review in general and judicial
supremacy in particular. The work of Larry Alexander and Frederick
Schauer illustrates a contrasting position. Advocating judicial
supremacy, Alexander and Schauer connect the settlement and
coordination functions of law with the special role of constitutional
principles, relying on the premise that the Constitution provides much
needed uniformity on controversial issues 194 and removes "a series of
transcendent questions from short-term majoritarian control."1 95
Arguing that the judiciary is well suited for fulfilling these values,
they reject the notion that, because the judiciary can err in their
constitutional interpretations, nonjudicial officers, who owe their
allegiance to the Constitution itself, should not be bound to judicial
pronouncements they believe wrong. Schauer and Alexander point
out that the Constitution itself is imperfect, but nonetheless performs
an important function. To take away a final interpretative authority
for choosing among competing constitutional interpretations, 196they
maintain, would deprive the document of much of its usefulness.
(b) Jealousy and Envy Literature
As Schauer and Alexander observe, the question of judicial
supremacy is a matter of "decision theory and political institutional
design and not direct moral compulsion." 197 One's resolution of the
191. Id. at 174. For a conflicting view on this point, for example, Barry Friedman,
Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 653 (1993) (arguing that judicial
review is part of a dynamic dialogue within the political process).
192. TUSHNET, supra note 7, at 174.
193. Id. at 30.
194. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1376 (1997) (arguing that constitutions provide
uniformity on issues "as to which people have divergent substantive views and personal
agendas").
195. Id. at 1380.
196. Id. at 1381.
197. Id. at 1362.
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judicial review question depends on how one balances the values of
consistency, settlement, and countermajoritarianism against the
values of dialogue and "populist" constitutional decisionmaking.
Relevant to the balance is the fact that the actors presently holding
the ultimate review power have reason for acting out their jealousy
and envy against other branches of government that also have a stake
in the matter. As a matter of design, does providing a vehicle for
expressing deleterious emotions such as jealousy and envy tip the
balance? One immediate response notes that, though palpable, the
evidence of jealousy and envy is incommensurable. Thus, an answer
to precisely how jealousy and envy influence the trade-off between
the two poles is unknowable.
Yet analysis reveals some relative points. While impossible to
measure, the influence of jealousy and envy in judicial review cannot
help the Schauer/Alexander position. Indeed, Tushnet's critique of
judicial review reflects deep appreciation for the role of ego in the
judicial development of constitutional doctrines generally and judicial
review doctrines specifically. 198 Tushnet challenges whether the
judiciary enjoys special stability and other qualities, which render it a
particularly appropriate institutional actor for making supreme
constitutional rulings. 99 The observations in this article buttress
these points.
At the same time, the jealousy and envy materials expose
significant flaws in Tushnet's position. Taking away supreme judicial
review eliminates the crown jewel of judicial power and, according to
the social scientists summarized above, renders the judiciary less
secure in their governmental function and thus more vulnerable to
negative expression of jealous and envious reactions to the power of
other branches. Without the self-esteem flowing from supreme
review powers, the judiciary may be less capable of the fruitful,
unburdened dialogue with other branches and the governed-a
dialogue forming a foundation for Tushnet's dream of a populist
Constitution.

198. TUSHNET, supra note 7, at 61.
[Slome defenses of judicial review rely on formalist doctrines so that courts can
control officials who, the judges believe, are less capable than the judges
themselves. That approach makes sense to the judges, but it should not make
sense to the officials. A legislator should be able to say, "who are they to tell me
that I'm no good at my job?"
Id.
199. Id. at 26-29.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52

Viewed in light of the literature on jealousy and envy, this
consequence of eliminating judicial review would strike an important
blow to judicial self-esteem. For those thinkers who espoused the
view that envy and jealousy are inherently bad, diminished selfesteem can exacerbate anger and other deleterious expressions of
these emotions within and without the federal judicial branch. For
those thinkers who saw the potential for jealousy and envy to
promote positive sentiments such as self-awareness and incentive to
achieve, the chances for these constructive emotions to flourish
diminish where envious or jealous persons are robbed of portions of
their identity that give them the ability to keep their negative
emotions within bounds and, perhaps, even to transform them into
20 0
positive achievements.
One may argue that the jealousy and envy literature does not
hurt Tushnet's position, since he starts from such a dim view of
judicial contributions to government. 201
According to this
perspective, a judiciary at special risk for laboring under jealousy and
envy does not, upon initial analysis, undermine Tushnet because his
model substantially relies on the constitutional acumen of entities
other than the judiciary. The resulting government, however, would
possess a judiciary without a particularly special role. Under the
political theory of Gonzalo Fernandez de la Mora, this lack of special
function can undermine the type of interaction among society and
government that Tushnet seeks to promote. Ferndandez de la Mora
explains:
[T]he envious person does not feel solidarity with the envied about
anything.... [E]nvy separates the envied from the others, and the
envious person progressively isolates himself from his own world.
Envy does not inspire rivalry and exemplarity, but incompatibility
and loneliness. How can a feeling that constitutes such an
antisocial attitude be used as a political adhesive? It does so by
establishing an alliance among those who share common envies to
carry out negative actions against the envied, as their passion
dictates. Indirect and divisive actions with indirect efforts are
devaluation, discredit, and the calumny of the envied; and among

200. ELSTER, supra note 74, at 86-87 (explaining that the moralist view that desire for
self-esteem can cause one to keep envy within bounds as well as to promote virtuous
actions). Supra notes 96, 118-19 and accompanying text for discussion of whether jealousy
and envy are capable of generating constructive actions and sentiments.
201. In addition to his negative description of the judiciary's track record with supreme
judicial review, Tushnet argues that his model will work only if "we were able to free
ourselves from our obsession with courts." TUSHNET, supra note 7, at 128.

ENVY AND JEALOUSY

November 2000]

the open strategies with direct efforts are aggression and
202

expropriation.
Thus Tushnet's means-eliminating all supreme judicial review-may
actually undercut his end: populist constitutionalism. Therefore, a
less risky approach may preserve at least some special role for the
judiciary.
(2) Minimizing JudicialReview

(a) Legal Scholarship
Much more popular than eliminating judicial review is the
203
approach of reducing the judiciary's use of its power.
Recommendations vary according to the optimum level of review
recommended. On one end of the restraint spectrum is the approach
of James Thayer, who suggested that federal courts grant the utmost
respect to other branches of government and invalidate statutes on
constitutional grounds only when Congress has "not merely made a
mistake, but ha[s] made a very clear one,-so clear that it is not open
to rational question." 204 On the other end of the restraint spectrum is
Cass Sunstein, who argues for a form of judicial minimalism that
actively involves the Supreme Court in controversial issues. Rather
than inviting the judiciary to settle the issues once and for all,
however, Sunstein sees the Court acting as a "democracy promoting"
facilitator, encouraging the elected branches and the people to engage
in constructive dialogues. 20 5 He urges that minimalism is usually
called for "when the Court is dealing with a constitutional issue of
high complexity about which many people care deeply and on which
the nation is divided (on moral or other grounds)." Sunstein endorses
202. FERNANDEZ DE LA MORA, supra note 69, at 93.
203. E.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 49, at 1210 (arguing that the key question
surrounding judicial review is "how much discretion the Court should have in interpreting
the meaning of the Constitution" and how judicial review can be structured so as to
promote the goals of democracy, which include "to resolve disputes peacefully and to
promote the noncoercive exercise of government authority,... to preserve individual
autonomy and liberty, and... to maximize equality and justice"); FERNANDEZ DE LA
MORA, supra note 69, at 159. See also McConnell, supra note 51, at 186 ("Judicial
restraint, in its various forms, is an internal 'check and balance' that mitigates the risks of
erroneous decisions by an institution, like the Supreme Court, that lacks democratic
accountability and whose decisions are difficult to change, even when mistaken.").
204. Thayer, supra note 188, at 144. Thayer's work on judicial review has been
enormously influential. E.g., Wallace Mendelson, The Influence of James B. Thayer Upon
the Work of Holmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter, 31 VAND. L. REv. 71, 72-73 (1978)
(discussing how justices adhered to Thayer's deferential standard of judicial review).
205. SUNSTEIN, supra note 60, at 24-27.
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"maximalism," which he describes as an attempted "broad and deep
solution" to controversies, when special preconditions are present,
such as the judiciary possessing a high degree of confidence in the
merits of the solution and the subject matter requiring advance
planning (as in a contract setting). 2 6 Commentators have observed
that Sunstein's optimum model does not deviate substantially from
20 7
the status quo on the current Supreme Court.
Another influential thinker staking out his own ground, Robert
Nagel, shares Thayer's and Sunstein's emphasis on public dialogue
and the competence of democratic institutions in making out his case
for judicial restraint. More critical than Sunstein of recent experience
with judicial review, Nagel maintains that the confrontation model of
judicial review imposes significant systemic costs on our government.
He argues that we should not underestimate the capacity of
"nonjudicial institutions" to enforce constitutional standards,
reasoning that judicial interpretation of the Constitution overvalues
"the internal quality of the explanations offered" and "the deftness
with which doctrine is used. ' 20 8 Instead, he favors a system that exalts
"a core of settled [constitutional] meaning [among constituents of
society] -settled both by the clear sense and history of the
'20 9
Constitution and by apparent public understandings.
While developing their own theoretical framework, both
Sunstein and Nagel owe lineage to Alexander Bickel's classic work on
restraint. Bickel argued that the Supreme Court should avoid
debilitating conflicts with the elected government by making use of
the "passive virtues," that is, procedural and jurisdictional delays that
span between the times when legislation is enacted and when
challenges to the legislation are adjudicated. In contrast with Nagel,
Bickel was thus more concerned with the "when" than the "ought" of
the judicial review. Similarly, Bickel contrasts with Sunstein who
206. Id. at 57. Sunstein's full list of preconditions for maximalism is as follows:
(1) when judges have considerable confidence in the merits of that solution, (2)
when the solution can reduce costly uncertainty for future courts and litigants,
(3) when advance planning is important, and (4) when a maximalist approach will
promote democratic goals either by creating the preconditions for democracy or
by imposing good incentives on elected officials, incentives to which they are
likely to be responsive.
Id.
207. Devins, supra note 60, at 1971-72 (stating that "as Sunstein tells it, his brand of
minimalism has already arrived"); Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Book Review, 9 L. & POL. BOOK
REV. 407 (1999) (reviewing SUNSTEIN, supra note 60) (stating that Sunstein "captures the
enthusiasm of many current Justices for minimalism").
208. NAGEL, supra note 49, at 24.
209. Id.
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focuses on tempering the Supreme Court's voice inthe active context
of adjudicating the merits of a controversy. For the purpose of this
article, Bickel's most significant contribution is his focus on
techniques for restraint, which include "humility and caution in the
declaration of potentially far-reaching new constitutional principles,
respect for the customs and mores of the times,"210 adherence to
canons of avoidance that show deference to other branches and levels
of government, 21 ' reliance on technical devices such as justiciability
213 and "measured rulings. 214
doctrines, 21 2 denials of certiorari,
Indeed, as shown below, technique has bearing on the degree to
which jealousy and envy are expressed in the context of judicial
review.
(b) Lessons of Jealousy and Envy Literature
Like the question whether to abolish supreme judicial review,
debates over the appropriate degree of judicial self-restraint also
benefit from understanding jealousy and envy. Arguments favoring
limitations on the power are similarly buttressed by the notion that
judicial review provides an outlet for sour grapes and lashing out at
other more privileged and powerful branches of government. What
sets these restraint arguments apart from those advocating total
elimination of supreme judicial review is their embrace of a role for
judicial review in very special circumstances. This embrace adds
significantly to enhancement of the judicial power, which, in turn,
serves judges' self-esteem. As a consequence, the restraint-ratherthan-eliminate approach taps into the advantages of "vocational
specialization" noted by Fernandez de la Mora. Similarly, the
approach benefits from the individualized function trumpeted by
psychologists studying how both individuals and systems profit from
assignment of unique tasks to components of a system. 215
210. Id. at 25.
211. Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious Constitutional Doubts: The Supreme
Court's Constructionof Statutes Raising Free Speech Concerns, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1,
9-24 (1996) (describing various formulations of the avoidance canon, which authorizes a
court to construe statutes to eliminate constitutional doubts about a statute).
212. BICKEL, supra note 23, at 115-19, 143-46, 183-97.
213. Id. at 127.
214. Kloppenberg, supranote 207, at 407.
215. Supra notes 128-132 for a discussion of vocational specialization and the
advantages of individualized functions. See also JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES 158 (1983)
(arguing that "[t]o the extent... that self-confidence has a positive effect on motivation
and achievement, excessively positive self-perception due to cognitive bias may have good
consequences, even when it falls short of a complete self-fulfilling prophesy").
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Preserving some level of supreme judicial review also helps avoid
another phenomenon: the increase in jealousy and envy when two
participants in a system enjoy parity. This observation was well
illustrated by the Court's tone in City of Boerne v. Flores,216 where the
Court evaluated whether Congress could engage in constitutional
interpretation in such a way as to put Congress on par with the Court
in an area crucial to the Court's self-definition. By maintaining some
level of supreme judicial review, the restraint theories maintain a
degree of role differentiation that can help keep jealousy and envy in
check-or at least can enable the judiciary to engage in coping
mechanisms, such as self-bolstering and selective ignoring.
Yet even more lessons flow from the restraint literature. For
example, viewed in light of the jealousy and envy problem, Nagel's,
Thayer's, and Sunstein's focus on dialogue highlights the problematic
Indeed, the haughty tone
nature of supreme judicial review.
emblematic of a person attempting to assert their superiority can
undermine other efforts by the speaker to construct a joint enterprise
with listeners.
Supreme judicial review makes less possible
meaningful dialogue between the judiciary and other entities. This
point is more pertinent to Thayer than to the others, since Nagel and
Sunstein seem most concerned with minimizing constitutional
interpretation altogether, while Thayer focuses on encouraging
nonlawyer members of the public to participate in the process of
2 17
constitutional interpretation.
Because jealousy and envy are tied to the dynamic of selfrestraint, these sentiments are key to choosing how restraint is
accomplished. To the extent that restraint takes place through means
that enhance dignity and courtliness, the role morality of appropriate
judicial behavior may help to keep jealousy and envy under control
or, even better, to harness the positive consequences of jealousy and
envy in the form of self-awareness and self-control. Bickel's passive
virtues, restraint through inaction, may be insufficiently rewarding to
judicial self-esteem to promote the careful calibration of judicial task

216. 521 U.S. 507, 523-30 (1997) (holding that separation of powers prevents Congress
from defining the scope of substantive rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, since a
contrary interpretation would undermine the judiciary's role of ensuring that the
Constitution is "superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means").
217. Christopher L. Eisgruber, DisagreeablePeople, 43 STAN. L. REV. 275, 284 (1990)
(observing that "Thayer favors judicial restraint because it will encourage constitutional
interpretation by non-lawyers, while Nagel supports restraint because it will help eliminate
constitutional interpretation entirely").
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needed to keep jealousy and envy under control. 218 Likewise,
Thayer's and Nagel's emphasis on constitutional interpretation by
entities other than the judiciary may insufficiently value the judicial
voice, with its expertise in order and process, to provide the optimum
level of reward that may encourage judicial self-restraint of jealous
and envious responses.
Sunstein's approach of a direct, yet measured, method of
constitutional review has the most promise. Indeed, Sunstein's praise
of the narrow and shallow technique of deciding controversial cases
strikes a balance between providing the judiciary with a specialized
role in the institutional structure and avoiding an open opportunity to
express negative sentiments flowing from a sense of inferiority in
relation to other branches. Through masterfully executed action, not
inaction, the judge can appreciate her own role in implementing what
Sunstein calls "incompletely theorized" resolutions and in facilitating
the processes of democracy; she can thereby save herself from
grandiose (and negative) expressions of her will. Because the
judiciary has an active role under Sunstein's model, the model is most
likely to develop the sense of a job well done as well as the feeling of
solidarity that Fernandez de la Mora and other thinkers deem
Supported by the
essential to keeping envy under control.
impartiality ideal as well as cultural symbols such as black robes,
sheltered chambers, and an elevated bench, the judge can relish her
restraint, but at the same time take credit for having added her own
two cents to resolution of key questions of governance. 219 The trick,
of course, is for the judge to avoid the trap of self-validation-using
the judicial review process to solidify the legitimacy of her right to
judicial review.220
218. Sometimes such constraints on judicial review can actually be self-defeating.
Raynes v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997) (restricting congressional standing to raise separation
of powers challenge to statute). See also Note, Standing in the Way of Separation of
Powers. The Consequences of Raines v. Byrd, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1741 (1999) (arguing
that Raines' limitation of congressional standing will invite the precise problem it sought
to avoid).
219. At first blush, it appears that this conclusion is belied by current experience-in
which the Court attempting to pursue a minimalist tract has rendered opinions brimming
with its own sense of self-importance. This inconsistency vanishes, however, when it is
noted that the Court has not pursued a policy of minimalism in federalism and separation
of powers cases, which provide the most dramatic examples of self-inflation in recent
Terms.
220. Eisgruber, supra note 217, at 290-91 (reviewing NAGEL, supra note 49) (observing
that "[t]hose outside the judiciary, by contrast, interpret the Constitution unfettered by the
need to legitimate the institution of judicial review, and so may invoke substantive
principles without drawing into question their authority to make such judgments").
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Distinguishing Among Separation of Powers, Federalism, and
Individual Rights Questions

Analysis of available mechanisms for restraint demonstrates that
the benefits and detriments of controlling envy and jealousy vary
according to the specific characteristics of the task the judge is asked
to perform. Similar subtlety appears in the analysis of the next
debate, which concerns whether judicial review should be stratified
according to subject matter. As in the earlier discussion, conclusions
vary according to changes in the context in which judicial review is
exercised.
(1) Legal Scholarship

Building on the work of Herbert Wechsler, 22 1 Jesse Choper
refined a model of judicial review that distinguishes among review of
individual rights questions, federalism questions, and separation of
powers questions-the latter term he uses to refer to the respective
powers of the three branches of the federal government. The
Wechsler/Choper distinction among the three types of questions has
framed much of the judicial review debate, providing the paradigm
around which many scholars have analyzed the appropriate scope of
this judicial function.
Using the tripartite structure, Choper concludes that federal
courts should decline to adjudicate constitutional questions regarding
federalism issues as well as the respective powers of Congress and the
President in relating to each other. 22 2 According to Choper,
resolution of those disputes is best remitted to the national political
Interestingly, Choper argues for relegation of
process. 2 23
congressional and presidential conflicts to those branches themselves
(and away from the judiciary) because each of the two branches "has
tremendous incentives jealously to guard its constitutional boundaries

221. Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543. 546-

58 (1954). Several scholars recognize the model as the brainchild of Wechsler and Choper.
E.g., PERRY, supra note 11, at 44; William Marshall, American Political Culture and the
Failures of Process Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 9, 149 (1998): John C. Yoo.
JudicialReview and Federalism,22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 197, 202 (1998).
222. CHOPER,supra note 43, at 175, 263.

223. Id. See generally Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and the
Idea of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 301, 302 (1989) (presenting the question

whether "separation of powers [should] remain a proposition of positive law or... return
to the realm of politics").
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and assigned prerogatives against invasion by the other. '224 As for
supreme judicial review of questions regarding the reach of the
"judicial power" in our national system of government, his suggestion
is different. Choper urges courts to intervene on these questions
rather than rely on a political process that lacks the capability to
resolve these questions sensitively and competently. Choper also
argues that judicial power issues most directly implicate individual
rights, which structurally require the protection of the politically
insulated judiciary.225
Although adopting Choper's three-part paradigm for analyzing
the appropriate scope of judicial review, many scholars disagree with
his conclusions about which categories of constitutional questions call
for searching judicial scrutiny.226 Criticizing Choper's position that
the individual rights questions need more attention than structural
questions, some scholars argue that primary judicial focus on
individual rights is misguided given the Framers' overarching concern
224. CHOPER, supra note 43, at 275. See also Cass R. Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter
the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 494-95 (1987) (explaining Holmesian notion that
separation of powers is a political question, beyond courts' competence to interpret and
apply). See also Jonathan L. Entin, Separation of Powers, the PoliticalBranches, and the
Limits of Judicial Review, 51 OHto ST. L.J. 175, 222 (1990) in which Professor Entin
argues that "Congress and the President would do better to seek to resolve their
separation of powers disputes by negotiating them in good faith ....Negotiated
resolutions of specific disagreements can decide smaller questions in ways that create a
foundation for similarly informal arrangements of future interbranch differences while
recognizing the contrasting interests of the governmental institutions involved."
Although Professor Tushnet toys with eliminating all judicial review, his views are in
line with Choper's to the extent that he finds most potent the arguments for eliminating
judicial review of federalism and separation of powers questions:
[A] combination of value-based and structure-based incentives makes it sensible
to think of the Constitution's provisions dealing with federalism and separation
of powers as self-enforcing: The constitutional values protected by those features
of our Constitution would not be threatened by eliminating judicial review,
particularly when we recognize that the courts might themselves mistakenly bar
our representatives from adopting policies that are in fact consistent with the
Constitution.
TUSHNET, supra note 7, at 123.
225. CHOPER, supra note 43, at 388-97. Choper also notes that adjudication by an
Article III court is often itself asserted as an individual right. Ik at 398-404.
226. Although dominant, Choper's categories for judicial review are not exclusive.
Several scholars have proposed other distinctions between areas for which judicial review
is needed and areas in which judicial review is unnecessary or illegitimate. See, e.g.,
Klarman, supranote 57, at 498, in which Klarman argues that judicial review is particularly
called for in two instances: where the "desire of representatives to perpetuate their hold
on office may induce them to act contrary to the preferences of their constituents" and
where "a temporary political majority (in the society and in the legislature)... [seeks] to
extend its hold on power into the future, when its members may no longer enjoy majority
status."
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with organization, not individual rights.2 27 According to this view,
overemphasizing individual rights at the expense of structural
questions is self-defeating, since the Framers looked to structure as
"the great protection of the individual, not the 'parchment barriers'
that were later (and with modest expectations) added to the
document. "228
From this premise, some theorists, such as Martin Redish,
maintain that vigorous judicial review is needed for all categories of
issues. 229
This view emphasizes the Constitution's structural
provisions as important backup systems, reasoning that to reject
judicial review to ensure these systems are operating "reflects
acceptance of a false dichotomy between the role of the individual
'230
rights and structural provisions of the Constitution.
Focusing on the particulars of Choper's separation of powers
arguments, Redish attacks the suggestion that the legislature and the
executive will effectively police separation of powers tensions
227. NAGEL, supra note 49, at 64 (1989) (observing that the Framers' focus was "power
allocation," not individuals); MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL
STRUCTURE 3 (1995) (arguing that emphasis on rights, not structure, is ironic given that
the Constitution originally "contained precious few direct references to the protection of
individual rights," and devoted its words instead to structuring the federal, "representative
democracy").
228. NAGEL, supra note 49, at 64-65. According to Nagel, a judiciary "deeply engaged
in achieving immediate justice for all individuals will not be sensitive to, or much
interested in, the intellectual and emotional preconditions for political competition
between sovereigns." Id. at 82. Nagel scorns the "urge to speak the language of rights
rather than the more abstract language of organization." Id. at 68.
229. REDISH, supra note 227, at 4-5 (arguing that, "because the political structure
envisioned in the Constitution is so central to the values that inhere in the concept of
limited government (namely, the avoidance of tyranny and the preservation of individual
liberty), the provisions that dictate that structure need to be enforced... [with]
consistency and enthusiasm"). Accord Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch,
105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1831-32 (1996) (parting company with Choper's position that
separation of powers and federalism issues should be largely nonjusticiable); PERRY,
supra note 11, at 49 (arguing that, in the context of "interpretative review," as opposed to
judicial policymaking, an activist judicial role is necessary for review of congressional
enactments on federalism grounds as well as federal separation of powers questions
involving whether "executive action has invaded congressional prerogatives" or whether
"congressional action has invaded executive prerogatives"); Steven G. Calabresi, "A
Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": in Defense of United States v. Lopez.
94 MICH L. REV. 752, 823-26 (1995) (judiciary is as well suited to enforce federalism
principles as it is to protect individual rights).
230. REDISH, supra note 227, at 20. See also Marshall, supra note 221, at 155 (arguing
that the judiciary should scrutinize federalism issues with the same rigor as civil liberties
issues because federalism "protects individual liberties by serving as a structural check on
the expansion of federal power"); Yoo, supra note 221, at 201 (noting that "[t]hroughout
the ratification debates, judicial review was cast by the Federalists as a necessary buttress
to the political safeguards of federalism").
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between the two branches. Reasoning that the legislative and
executive branches will not necessarily tend toward an equilibrium
that reflects the preferences of the majority of citizens, he observes
that institutional restraints on both the executive and legislature may
prevent each from effectively monitoring the other33 1 The
consequence is that, without judicial review, no mechanism exists to
detect accurately whether incursions on the balance of power are
3
underway23
He also points out that the two branches may not have
the best interests of constitutional democracy at heart when they
acquiesce in incursion by the other branch, arguing that the "assent of
one political branch [does not] necessarily purif[y] a usurpation of
power by the other political branch. '' 233 Along similar lines, another
scholar finds legitimacy in judicial supervision of legislative-executive
conflict because the court is not making its own policy but rather
choosing among the competing policies of "electorally accountable"
branches.34
For questions of federalism, Redish challenges Choper's
assumption that the states can protect their interests through the
national political process. He points out that without judicial review
of federalism questions, situations may arise where a majority of
states may propound a policy negatively impacting a minority of
states3P5 In addition, he maintains, federalism protections are as
countermajoritarian as individual rights protections and for that
36
reason equally deserving of protection through judicial review.2
Other scholars bolster Redish's position by pointing out that
judicial review of both federalism and separation of powers questions
presents something of a self-fulfilling prophesy. Through review of
these sensitive issues of power, the judiciary bolsters its own position
or amasses "political capital" and, thereby, legitimates its own power
to engage in such review337 The judiciary has therefore established
231. REDISH, supra note 227, at 17-18. See also Thomas 0. Sargentich, The
ContemporaryDebate About Legislative-Executive Separation of Powers,72 CORNELL L.
REV. 430,441-42 (1987) (attacking Choper's labeling of the checks and balances system as
essentially self-correcting, and arguing that "it is by no means clear that the legislative and
executive branches tend toward an equilibrium in which neither branch has a systematic
structural advantage over the other").
232. REDISH, supra note 227, at 18.
233. lId
234. PERRY,supranote 11, at 59.
235. REDISH, supra note 227, at 18.
236. Id. at 19-20.
237. PERRY, supra note 11, at 57 (Supreme Court has "amassed a great deal of the
political capital it now enjoys.., precisely by resolving problems arising under the
doctrines of federalism and of the separation-of-powers"); see also ARCHIBALD COX, THE
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itself as an effective watchdog to ensure that governmental structures
are functioning appropriately.
Fueled by recent Supreme Court activism in the federalism area,
the bulk of recent writing about Choper's model has focused on
whether questions concerning the appropriate scope of federal and
state authority call for heightened judicial scrutiny. Like Redish,
many scholars come out on the side of searching judicial review,
relying in part on the view that federalism protections act as the
handmaiden of individual rights guarantees. 238 Some add that, in the
increasingly complex and nationalized political culture of
contemporary America, the temptation to federalize regulation of
social problems is simply too great to place faith in the ability of
members of Congress to represent states as states and to guard
239
against federal expansion at state expense.

Others take a contrary view of the Court's recently aggressive
federalism decisions. These scholars argue that the Supreme Court is
ill-equipped to answer questions pertaining to federal/state regulatory

power and more effective guidance comes from the available open
arenas where everyone can debate federal power and state
240
sovereignty in both the federal and state electoral processes.

(2) Lessons ofJealousy and Envy Literature

Along with the other debates I analyze here, the controversy
over which subject area of constitutional interpretation best
withstands judicial supremacy implicates complex structural questions
that cannot be resolved solely by reference to the jealousy and envy
(explaining that
"history legitimated the power [of judicial review], and then habit took over to guide
men's actions so long as the system worked well enough").
238. Marshall, supra note 221, at 155 (arguing that the judiciary should scrutinize
federalism issues with the same rigor as civil liberties issues because federalism "protects
individual liberties by serving as a structural check on the expansion of federal power"):
Yoo, supra note 221, at 201 (noting that "[t]hroughout the ratification debates, judicial
review was cast by the Federalists as a necessary buttress to the political safeguards of
federalism").
239. E.g., Marshall, supra note 221, at 148-53.
240. E.g., Larry D. Kramer, But When Exactly Was Judicial-Enforced Federalism
"Born" in the First Place?, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 123, 135-36 (1998). Professor
Kramer maintains that the political process is "a whole lot more prudent than the Court"
and observes that state governments are still principally responsible for most of the things
that affect most of the people most of the time-a role they have managed to preserve
without significant help from the Supreme Court. See also Hovenkamp, supra note 57, at
2247. Professor Hovenkamp maintains that the Court's review should be deferential if
reasonable minds can differ over the constitutionality of federal regulation of the states.
The "fix," he maintains, is for "voters to elect less imperial members of Congress."
ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 30 (1972)
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literature. Indeed, because the jealousy and envy literature sheds
light on the psyche of individual governmental actors and because I
used the literature to analyze only one type of actor (judicial officers),
many important political interactions remain undissected in the
present effort.241 Thus, this section (perhaps even more than its
counterparts elsewhere in this article) is confined by necessity to
evaluating how jealousy and envy may contribute to evaluating the
debates, rather than resolving the issue of which constitutional
disputes call for supreme judicial review.
As the analysis of general restraints on judicial review suggest,
moderation of supreme judicial review may provide a healthy
compromise that best balances the need for judicial self-esteem
blended with restrictions on opportunities for negative expressions of
jealousy and envy. In the context of the subject matter debate,
compromise could be achieved by authorizing a more probing review
in some subject matters than in others. If certain subject areas are
carved out for searching judicial review, the judiciary may be able to
develop the sense of vocational specialization deemed key to fending
off or coping with jealousy and envy. Thus, the question becomes
whether some subject matter categories are less problematic than
others.
Much from the jealousy and envy literature commends individual
rights as the candidate for supreme judicial review that is least
conducive to jealousy and envy. Unlike separation of powers and
federalism, judicial self-interest is at a minimum in this context
because the judiciary's own power generally does not hang in the
balance. Instead, the judiciary is acting as the protector of individuals
to whom it theoretically owes no particular loyalties, except as
defined by its duty to uphold federal law.242 Where a case presents an
individual deserving of protection and empowerment, the judiciary
can intercede in favor of the individual with little threat to its own
authority and prerogative. Because individual rights cases present
important, sometimes highly politicized, questions implicating the
241. The type of politics that may influence the debate, but are nonetheless not
included in the present analysis, include such state/federal interactions as state officials
who fight federal initiatives by "organizing opposition among the people, establishing
committees of correspondence with officials in other states, and forcing Congress to back
down through protest.., or by actively campaigning to unseat unsatisfactory
representatives." Kramer, supranote 240, at 128.
242. But see Little, supra note 1, at 728-54, for discussion of ways in which federal
institutional structures reinforce subtle bonds of loyalty between judges and other entities
in society.
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core of our social values, federal judges disposing of such cases with
intelligence and dispassionate reason can enjoy a sense of
accomplishing an essential governmental task in a superior manner.
The individual rights context is not free of potential jealousy and
envy issues, since the judge is given the opportunity to decide that the
actions of another government officer were improper.
This
supervisory role may provide a vehicle to indulge rivalrous impulses
as well as to perpetuate strained relations with other organs of
government through paternalist actions or expressions of hostile
attitudes. Moreover, the judge may perceive that she improves her
own status in government (in relation to officers in other
departments) by using the very important power of protecting
individual citizens.
The individual rights context may also be problematic precisely
because it does not directly implicate institutional roles. Because
individual rights are personal in nature, individual rights cases call for
the federal judge to assist a fellow human being. Thus, the "moral
claim" of the individual may create "an inevitable insistence on
'actualization."' 243 While this observation is relevant to the concern
that personal emotions such as jealousy and envy may influence
decisionmaking, no direct causal connection exists between the two.
That is-just because individual rights cases may pull on the heart
strings of judges as fellow humans, it does not necessarily follow that
this human response will also cause the judge to integrate into
decisionmaking her jealousy and envy toward other branches of
government. Accordingly, while individual rights cases are not a
wholly unwelcome medium for a court to express jealousy and envy
toward other branches, little suggests that the subject matter of the
cases will actually encourage judges to express those emotions. The
jealousy and envy literature therefore supports the position of
Choper, Redish, and others who urge supreme judicial review of
individual rights questions.
The situation is different for issues of institutional structure.
Institutional structure questions are not "immediately localized in
individuals" 244 and thus do not, at first blush, appear to tread on
personal emotions such as jealousy and envy. But many structural
issues implicate the currency of federal court power, something about
which federal judges-blessed with intelligence, savoir-faire, and
expertise in the subtleties of authority-are keenly sensitive. Thus,
243. NAGEL, supra note 49, at 71 (quoting Owen Fiss, supra note 56, at 1).
244. Id.
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these issues can actually provide a judge with fodder for jealous and
envious sentiments toward other branches.
Some structural issues, however, are more problematic than
others-the issues promising most problems arise in separation of
powers disputes implicating the role of the federal judiciary. Because
these controversies implicate the judiciary's own power, they are most
likely to tempt the judiciary to act negatively in response to power
assaults from other branches either by attacking the threatening
branch through criticism, omitting positive attributes, or magnifying
negative attributes, or, alternatively, by turning on itself and
unnecessarily devaluing the power and capabilities of the judicial
branch. In the context of evaluating its power in light of its "coequal
counterparts" within the federal government, the judiciary is most
likely to perceive that another branch's power gain is the judiciary's
loss. It is within such a dynamic that philosophers argue envy is most
likely to flourish. 45
Less likely to provoke expression of jealous and envious feelings
are questions relating to the power relationships between Congress
and the President, which do not directly implicate judicial authority.
That is not to say that judicial power is irrelevant to resolving these
questions, which arise within a dynamic governmental system whose
interdependent parts include the federal judiciary. Because a
decision to prefer the prerogatives of Congress over the President, or
vice versa, can have an effect on judicial power, the judiciary may
have strong reason to consider their own jealous or envious
sentiments toward the other branches in deciding whom to prefer. Of
course, the judiciary's preference for the President or Congress may
depend on complex structural, historical, and political factors. 246
245. E.g., Ben-Ze'ev, supra note 74, at 577. This argument is undercut to the extent
that power held by branches of the federal government is not a zero sum game. Indeed,
there are at least two other potential sources of power that can enrich the authority of a
single branch of the federal government-the people and the state. Psychologists'
observation that envy is greatest with respect to those "closest" to an individual suggests
that the judiciary is most likely to perceive a threat from other federal branches than from
representatives of the state government or from the even farther removed and more
amorphous concept of the people. Prevailing doctrines and culture that favor keeping
power within the federal government also support this conclusion.
246. Scholars have observed a tendency, however, for the Supreme Court to prefer
executive power over congressional power. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, A Paradox
Without a Principle: A Comment on the Burger Court's Jurisprudence in Separation of
Powers Cases, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1084 (1987) (observing a tendency by the Burger
Court to be "totally deferential in reviewing challenges to executive conduct, but.., very
willing to declare unconstitutional congressional statutes as violating separation of
powers").
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Nevertheless, the possibility exists that the judiciary will integrate into
that choice jealousy and envy arising from such matters as recent
Reinforcing this
interactions with one of the two branches.
conclusion, the jealousy and envy literature establishes that both
sentiments most likely rear up when an individual is negotiating
relationships among "close kin," a description that aptly describes the
judiciary's role in adjudicating power conflicts among other branches
with whom it shares sovereignty. With these qualifications, it
nevertheless is plain that jealousy and envy are more likely to flourish
when the separation of powers issue directly implicates judicial
power.
These observations strike a blow to Choper's paradigm, which
advocates preserving supreme judicial review of separation of powers
questions implicating the power of the judiciary and eliminating
federal court review of questions concerning the respective powers of
the Congress and the President in relating to each other. In fact, the
jealousy and envy literature reverses the preferences expressed by
Choper by suggesting a preference for judicial review of federal
separation of powers issues pertaining to legislative/executive
relations.
The reflections of the jealousy and envy literature on federalism
review also do not support Choper's approach, which advocates no
supreme judicial review of such questions. Many reasons suggest
federalism questions are particularly well insulated from jealous and
envious responses. Like other institutional questions, federalism
issues are often abstract, nonpersonal, and removed from concrete
human relations. For this reason, the questions do not provide
particularly fertile soil for negative emotions.
Federalism questions also lack many of the complications of
separation of powers concerns. Because the federal judiciary enjoys
supremacy over members of state government, the chances of a
federal judge expressing hostility toward those entities are slim. The
federal judiciary's superior status is well entrenched through the
Supremacy Clause itself,247 Congress' repeated decisions to federalize
regulation of social problems, American society's emphasis on the
particular excellence of the federal judiciary, and mainstream legal
While this superior position may be slipping
scholarship. 248
247. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
248. See, e.g., Laura E. Little, The Future of the Federal Judiciary, 70 TEMP. L. REV.
1151 (1997) (outlining attraction of federal judiciary as optimum forum for dispute
resolution); Jonathan R. Macey, FederalDeference to Local Regulatorsand the Economic
Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-ChoiceExplanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV.
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somewhat, 249 it continues to vest the federal judiciary with some
confidence in their standing and abilities. To lash out at state
government would therefore be to attack those whose existence is key
to vesting the federal judiciary with prestige and elite stature.
To the extent that the federal judiciary is cast as the weakest
branch of the federal government, one might conceivably argue that
the judiciary feels victimized and could fall prey to the occasional
tendency of abuse victims to play out their hostility and insecurities
by abusing those weaker than themselves. But this dynamic is not a
likely one for federal judges. First, no evidence suggests that the
federal judges ever perceive themselves as victims. Even if they did,
they are unlikely to retaliate against other governmental actors who
hold reduced status. Such a pattern of abuse is simply too
undistinguished for individuals who are screened for "judicial
temperament," and who are subject to potent professional norms
reinforced through ethical rules, disqualification procedures, due
process constraints, and an oath of office as well as through cultural
symbols of esteem such as the blind justice icon appearing on
'250
courthouses and the moniker "Your Honor."
Much more consistent with federal judges' role morality is the
notion that they may experience great ease in rising above base
sentiments such as jealousy and envy in adjudicating disputes
concerning those governmental actors who are subject to the federal
Constitution's Supremacy Clause. This conclusion is consistent with
the suggestion throughout the envy and jealousy literature that the
most likely object of negative reactions are those who prompted the
emotions initially. Thus, the literature suggests that other federal

265 (1990) (outlining the advantages of federal law as a regulatory instrument); Burt
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977) (outlining institutional
superiority of the federal judiciary over state counterparts).
249. Recent legal scholarship is perhaps a harbinger of this slippage. E.g., Judith
Resnik, Trialas Error,Jurisdictionas Injury: Transformingthe Meaning of Article 111, 113
HARv. L. REv. 924 (2000) (observing that the federal judiciary has taken a number of
recent stances that potentially threaten its status, such as an anti-adjudication, prosettlement agenda, opposition to creation of new federal rights, and delegation of tasks to
non-Article III judges); William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST.
CoMMENT. 599 (1999) (observing that the state court success of gay civil rights litigants
reveals institutional characteristics of state courts that make them no less well situated
than federal courts to demonstrate empathy for minority concerns in certain situations).
250. Another common image associated with federal judges is the hero, either in the
form of "Hercules" or otherwise. Resnik, supra note 249, at 927 (observing that "[liegal
and popular culture portray federal judges as solemn and deliberate-sometimes assuming
heroic proportions").

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52

branches, rather than the states, are the most likely targets of a
jealous or envious judiciary.
Unfortunately, the analysis of jealousy and envy in federalism
adjudication has complicating dynamics. Although the abstract
institutional quality of federalism issues and the Supremacy Clause's
mandate militate against strong emotional expression, other factors
suggest that the federal judiciary's personal sentiments may hang in
the balance. As Robert Nagel argues, federalism issues implicate the
Federalist presupposition that "state governments exist as alternative
objects of loyalty to the national government.125 1 In other words, the
vertical separation of powers between state and federal governments
effectively allocates power only if the population "perceive[s] states
as legitimate, separate governments." In this light, federalism issues
provide a way for the federal judiciary to lecture Congress and the
Executive
on
proper
behavior
toward
"subordinate
governments," 252 -thus allowing the all-knowing judiciary to explain
how the deference to the state and local governments is good for the
federal government and to the nation as a whole.
Also under Nagel's conception, federalism raises the specter of
divided loyalties among the governed, something that may pull on the
same ego strings as envy and jealousy. Put another way-the federal
and state governments overlap extensively and, as a consequence of
this jurisdictional concurrency, federalism questions implicate the
power of the federal judiciary directly. The federal judiciary
therefore has reason to interpret state sovereignty as a possible threat
to its own power within our federalist union. Indeed, the 2000
Presidential election campaign decisions may bear out this point.
Most notably, the United States Supreme Court's per curiam in Bush
v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board253 reflects strong evidence of
2 54
the Court asserting itself against state authority.
251. NAGEL, supra note 49, at 74.

252. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, 299 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The
existence of subordinate governments, to which the people are attached ... forms a
barrier against the enterprises of ambition.").
253. 121 S. Ct. 471 (2000).
254. Id. at 473-74. The Court observed that although "it defers to a state court's
interpretation of a state statute" as a general rule, it must act with a heavier hand where
state legislation applies "to the selection of Presidential electors." Id. Although subject to
conflicting interpretations, the Court's self-conscious recognition of its heavy handedness
in the subsequent election decision also shows jealous guardianship of federal judicial
power. See Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000):
None are more conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority than are
members of this Court, and none stand more in admiration of the Constitution's
design to leave the selection of the President to the people, through their
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Although these complications' effect on decisionmaking is
incommensurable, some reference points emerge. Logic suggests that
the complications may actually cancel each other out-with the
federal judiciary tempted to protect the states from incursion by other
federal branches on the one hand, yet hostile to the states on the
other hand because of the potential threat posed by the populace's
embrace of state sovereignty. Empirically, however, the United
States Supreme Court's recent heavy-handedness in federalism
decisions suggests that these countervailing impulses are not presently
in equipoise. Instead, the Court's repeated indulgence in lessons to
other branches on the virtues of state sovereignty and the evils
flowing from federal incursion suggests that the Court presently sees
a significant need to assert itself as norm setter in the federalism
area-a judicial role in which the other branches may not wholly
acquiesce. The danger then seems greatest that the federal judiciary
will express jealousy and envy toward the other federal branches in
connection with federalism decisions. For example, one could argue
that the Supreme Court's aggressive review of Congress' assertions
of power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment stems in part
from jealousy over Congress' superior law-making power expressed
in section 5 itself.255 To the extent that section 5 authorizes an
unusually overbearing congressional role in enforcement, the Court
has vociferously ensured that this congressional role remains subject
to the Court's own "special" powers of constitutional interpretation.
To the extent that the Court's assertiveness is motivated
improperly by jealousy and envy, that danger must be balanced
against the potential increase in self-esteem resulting from the judicial
role of protector of state prerogatives. It is also a danger that
arguably could be mitigated when the judiciary uses certain types of
analysis in disposing of federalism questions. Indeed, some scholars
argue that a formalist approach to decisionmaking constrains such
extraneous, improper influence.

legislatures .... When contending parties invoke the process of the courts,
however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve the federal and
constitutional issues ....
Id. at 533.
255. Debates about the appropriate level of judicial supervision of Congress's use of
enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment implicate fascinating
issues relevant to envious overtones in the Court's relationship with Congress. E.g., City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), and Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62
(2000).
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C.

Choosing an Analytical Approach: Functionalism versus Formalism
In each of the three areas of constitutional review, the Supreme
Court uses a wide variety of legal analysis. The area of individual
rights includes possibly the most diverse array of approachesranging from originalism, strict textual analysis, and objectivism to
balancing tests and ends-means scrutiny. Different standards apply
according to which constitutional provision is implicated.
For
example, most recently, the Court has insisted on particularly
intrusive evaluation of legislation enacted pursuant to section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's depth of review also varies
according to Court composition, prevailing adjudicatory norms, and
legal and political climates. As an example, changes in mode and
depth of review are particularly striking in federalism jurisprudence,
which has waxed and waned dramatically over the last several
decades. After a flurry of intrusive judicial review in the 1970's,256 the
Court retreated for a time.257 In the 1990's, however, the Court
vigorously renewed its scrutiny of federal encroachments on state
power, 2 8 commencing what some call a revolution or era of judicial
activism to revive "the structural guarantees of dual sovereignty." 259
The jealousy and envy literature reviewed above holds much
insight in evaluating this evolving variety of adjudicative approaches.
The broad range of variations, however, is not easily distilled for
manageable analysis. Nevertheless, the literature analyzing judicial
review does present one contrast particularly pertinent to the
discussion here:
the competing strategies of formalism and
functionalism in resolving disputes. Courts and scholars have long
associated these alternative jurisprudential approaches with
horizontal separation of powers disputes among the branches of the
federal government. Yet the formalism/functionalism dichotomy
emerges in all aspects of legal decisionmaking, including the Supreme
Court's federalism and individual rights cases. 260 Because of the great
256. E.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
257. E.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (reducing
scrutiny under the Tenth Amendment).
258. This switch in course began with Eleventh Amendment cases, such as Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991), and continued through interpretations of the Tenth
Amendment in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), the Commerce Clause,
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and the Fourteenth Amendment, City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
259. Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 893 (4th Cir. 1999)
(Wilkinson, J., concurring), affd sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
260. Evan H. Caminker, Context and Complementarity within Federalism Doctrine, 22
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 161, 161 n.1 (1998) (observing that formalism/functionalism
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variety of analyses and constitutional provisions governing individual
rights, a taxonomy of individual rights jurisprudence is beyond the
scope of this article. Analysis of formalism and functionalism in
governmental structure cases, however, is part of a more general
current debate spawned by a renewed interest in the merits of
formalism. 2 61 I therefore present an overview of this current scholarly
work on formalism and functionalism generally and next describe
how these approaches manifest in the resolving disputes about
governmental structure. This will provide the groundwork for
evaluating the contribution of jealousy and envy literature.
(1) Formalismand Functionalism: GeneralJurisprudentialDebate,
Separationof Powers,and Federalism

(a) General Debates About the Merits of Formalism and Functionalism
As a jurisprudential approach, formalism is fighting back. Until
recently a term of unquestionable insult, formalism now has
important champions.262 Often associated with originalism in the
context of constitutional adjudication, formalism as a general concept
is characterized by adherence to norms without searching evaluation
of the goals the norms are meant to achieve. 263 Justice Scalia puts the
matter less abstractly: "The rule of law is about form .... Long live

debate "typically is more played out in discussions of separation of powers principles ...
but it also surfaces in discussions of federalism"); Thomas W. Merrill, Toward a Principled
Interpretation of the Commerce Clause, 22 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 31, 31 (1998)
(describing formalism in constitutional adjudication as "the jurisprudence of rules" and
functionalism as "the jurisprudence of balancing tests").
261. E.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); ERNEST
J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 22-23 (1995) (arguing that "formalism...

embodies a profound and inescapable truth about law's inner coherence").
262. Thomas C. Grey, The New Formalism, 1 (1999) (unpublished manuscript on file
with the author), available at http://papers.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=200732 (observing
that formalism has experienced a resurgence as a result of the efforts of Antonin Scalia,
Frederick Schauer, Ernest Weinrib, Robert Summers, and Richard Epstein). But see
KENNEDY, supra note 7, at 25 (arguing that "[iegal theorists ... unanimously reject any
kind of 'formalism"').
263. Larry Alexander, "With Me, It's All er Nuthin". Formalism in Law and Morality,
66 U. CHI. L. REv. 530,531 n.2 (1999). As with any concept, formalism has several forms,
which may be described as "(1) formalism as anti-consequential morality in law; (2)
formalism as a purposive rule-following; and (3) formalism as a regulatory tool for
producing optimally efficient mixes of law and norms in contract enforcement." Richard
H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 607, 607 (1999). The second
description is the form I analyze in this piece:
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formalism. It is what makes a government a government of laws and
'264
not of men."
Formalism does not have a canonical opposite. In addition to the
term "functionalism," the names "antiformalism," "nonformalism,"
and "pragmatic functionalism" sometimes appear as the competing
jurisprudential strategy. 265 Whatever its proper name, the competing
strategy to formalism tends to favor flexibility in decisionmaking,
invoking purposes or background principles to answer difficult
questions of interpretation. 266 The competing strategy often resolves
disputes by reference to standards, a term that can be defined as
abstract concepts that "refer to the ultimate policy or goal animating
the law. '267 In order to track the literature analyzing separation of
powers and federalism disputes, I will use the term functionalism to
refer to formalism's competing strategy-with the caveat that the
term functionalism may not be coextensive with other words scholars
have used. I also emphasize that the competing strategies are not
realistically represented by opposing poles, but rather as orientations
along a continuum. 268 What is clear, however, is that both formalism

and functionalism are key to understanding judicial review because
they implicate the issue of how and to what extent society should try
to restrain judicial discretion.
Frederick Schauer, whose contemporary advocacy for formalism
is particularly nuanced, argues that rules serve the salutary purpose of
reducing the universe of appropriate factors or considerations the
decisionmaker may legitimately incorporate into resolution of a

264.

ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:

FEDERAL COURTS AND

THE LAW 25 (1997); See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 426 (1989) (Scalia, J.,

dissenting) ("[A] government of laws means a government of rules.").
265. Grey, supra note 262 (using the term pragmatic functionalism); Mark D. Rosen,
Nonformalistic Law in Time and Space, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 622, 623 (1999) (using the term
nonformalistic); Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI.
L. REV. 636, 639 (1999) (using the term antiformalism).
266. Sunstein, supra note 265, at 639 (observing that the antiformalist is "concerned
about avoiding the kinds of rigidity that can lead to injustices and mistakes .... [a]nd
might contend that courts legitimately invoke purposes, or background principles of
various kinds" when interpreting).
267. Rosen, supra note 265, at 623 (using the term "'nonformalistic law' synonymously
with 'standards' as it appears" in literature analyzing the rules/standards debate).
268. Sunstein, supra note 265, at 640. Sunstein argues that the division between
formalists and their competing strategies is along a continuum. One pole is represented by
those who aspire to textually driven, rule-bound, rule-announcing judgments; the other is
represented by those who are quite willing to reject the text when it would produce an
unreasonable outcome, or when it is inconsistent with the legislative history, or when it
conflicts with policy judgments of certain kinds or substantive canons of construction.
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dispute.269 Other scholars favoring formalism also tend to defend the
approach by reference to its desirable consequences.270 In addition to
the efficiency and psychological ease resulting from reducing the
factors relevant to adjudication, other purported virtues include
"coordination of behavior" 271 as well as "reduction of error costs"
resulting because formalism seeks to ensure deference to the "greater
expertise of rulemakers as against rule appliers."2 72
Pre-realist functionalists such as Holmes, Pound, and Cardozo
saw formalism as providing an account of law that was both
incomplete and impossible to attain. Responding to these perceived
deficiencies, these thinkers embraced the policy-oriented approach of
functionalism in recognition of their belief that judges' ultimate
fidelity must be to the public welfare- "serving the sum of the
interests of individuals and social groups."2 73 Through its emphasis
on legal concepts as instruments for making practical judgments,
functionalism has always reflected an intellectual connection with
pragmatism.2 74 Despite important subsequent intellectual movements
such as legal realism and Critical Legal Studies, some maintain that
functionalism provides the prevailing modem orthodoxy in American
legal thought. 275

Those endorsing functionalism in contemporary

writing today continue to justify their position largely by reference to
problems with formalism, emphasizing formalism's illusionary nature
and the challenges in developing ex ante rules that accommodate
2 76
rapid changes in society, technology, and scholarly knowledge.

269. SCHAUER, supra note 261, at 159.
270. E.g., Merrill, supra note 260, at 31 (arguing that "there are good functionalist
reasons to be a formalist").
271. Pildes, supra note 263, at 613 (summarizing the views of Larry Alexander);
Alexander, supra note 263, at 534 (describing a coordination problem as "any cost that
results from moral disagreement or from uncertainty about how others will resolve
questions about what they are morally permitted, required, or forbidden to do").
272. Pildes, supra note 263, at 613; Alexander, supra note 263, at 534 (arguing that
formalism promotes "authoritative settlement" of disputes, which "solves the problems of
coordination,expertise, and efficiency").
273. Grey, supra note 262, at 10-12 (summarizing the works of Pound, Holmes, and
Cardozo).
274. Id at 12 (outlining link between functionalism and pragmatism).
275. Id.at 9 (arguing that the "functionalist policy-oriented affirmative account of
law... has become modem orthodoxy").
276. Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism and Functionalismin FederalismAnalysis, 13 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 959, 984 (1997) (arguing that the seductions of formalist reasoning should
be rejected in favor of functionalism); Rosen, supra note 265, at 622 (describing conditions
under which ex ante rulemaking is ill advised).
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(b) Formalism and Functionalism in Separation of Powers Cases
Before even getting to the issue whether functionalism or
formalism is most appropriate for a court adjudicating separation of
powers disputes, some scholars suggest that the more crucial issue is
whether separation of powers disputes present political questions
beyond judicial expertise. The Supreme Court has paid little heed to
these suggestions, apparently finding its invitation to treat separation
of powers questions as justiciable from both the constitutional text
and the Constitution's attempt to assign discrete functions, checks,
and balances to the three branches. Through repeated expeditions
into interbranch disputes and by removing political question obstacles
to adjudicating those disputes, the Supreme Court has engraved this
invitation for legal doctrine to umpire relationships among the
governmental branches. The doctrine, however, is remarkably
uneven. Under one estimate, the Supreme Court applied a formalist
approach in approximately one-half of the separation of powers cases
in the last century and functionalist methodology in the other half of
cases.

277

Critics describe the United States Supreme Court's strategy for
resolving separation of powers disputes as wavering between rigorous
enforcement with a "formalistic vengeance" to a functionalism which
is apt "to do little more than rationalize incursions by one branch ...
into the domain of another. '278 While remarkable in how they gyrate
unpredictably between these contrasting methodologies, the decisions
are constant in their focus on the various branches as distinct
institutions with an inventory of available powers. 279

Traditional

scholarship, too, has focused on the federal institutions as institutions
and employed the Constitution's various vesting clauses outlined
above to carry the burden of separation of powers theory.280 From
this starting point, the choice of formalism or functionalism, however,
has a decisive impact on the result-with formalist decisions
277. Laura S. Fitzgerald, CadencedPower: The Kinetic Constitution, 46 DUKE L.J. 679,
690 (1997) (explaining that applying a formalist approach in one-half the cases led the
Court to strike down the challenged action).
278. REDISH, supra note 227, at 3.
279. E.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 329 (1816) (describing the
"three great departments of government" as follows: "[t]he first was to pass laws, the
second to approve and execute them, and the third to expound and enforce them").
280. E.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants,88 Nw. U. L. REV.

1377 (1997). Other more dynamic analyses are possible, however, such as those that focus
on how the Constitution structures political constituencies. See Fitzgerald, supra note 275,

at 684 (arguing that constituent-based politics, not institutions, is the Constitution's "core
structural principle").
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invalidating legislation or other governmental action and functionalist
decisions upholding the challenged governmental act.281
Under the formalist approach, the Court matches tasks with
governmental branches: first categorizing the disputed governmental
activity as judicial, executive, or legislative, and then disposing of the
separation of powers challenge according to whether the appropriate
branch bears responsibility for the activity3m A recent example of
formalist reasoning appeared in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,28 3 in
which the Court characterized the challenged activity as implicating
the judicial function of reopening final judgments and declared that
Congress violated separation of powers principles by arrogating to
itself power over this activity.3 4 As articulated by Justice Scalia,
formalism reflects the premise that the Court should not indulge
"improvisation of a constitutional structure on the basis of currently
perceived utility."'
Reflecting a functionalist methodology, the balance of the
Supreme Court's separation of powers jurisprudence tolerates one
governmental branch performing an activity that the Constitution
appears to assign to another branch. In evaluating these incursions,
however, the functionalist asks whether one branch impermissibly
aggrandizes itself or impinges the core function or domain of another
branch.286 Take the example of the majority opinion evaluating the
Independent Counsel Act in Morrison v. Olson. s Acknowledging
that the Act vested the executive task of prosecution in Congress and
281. Mark Tushnet, The Sentencing Commission and ConstitutionalTheory: Bowls and
Plateaus in Separation of Powers Theory, 66 S.CAL. L. REV. 581, 584 (1992) (observing
that "[f]ormalist opinions almost invariably strike down legislation; functional opinions
almost invariably uphold it").
282. E.g., Krent, supra note 18, at 1254 (formalists resolve disputes according to the
formula that legislatures should engage in lawmaking, executives should engage in
enforcing the law, and the judiciary should interpret the law); Fitzgerald, supra note 277,
at 690 (describing formalist separation of powers methodology as "an exercise in
taxonomy"); Chemerinsky, supra note 246, at 1088-92 (describing formalist/originalist
reasoning as operating by syllogism).
283. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
284. Id.at 217-18 (holding that "Congress has exceeded its authority by requiring the
federal courts to exercise '[t]he judicial Power of the United States,' U.S. Const., Art. III,
§1, in a manner repugnant to the text, structure, and traditions of Article III").
285. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
286. Krent, supra note 18, at 1255 (explaining that the functionalists are content so long
as the "power assumed by one branch does not threaten to disturb the basic allocation of
powers intended by the Framers"); Fitzgerald, supra note 277, at 702 (explaining that
functionalism protects each branch's "'integrity' while tolerating.., task-sharing that
advances" the interests of the government as a whole).
287. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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the Judiciary, the Morrison Court reasoned that the Act avoided
constitutional difficulties because it did not "interfere impermissibly
with [the executive's] constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful

execution of the laws" 288 and did not increase Congress' power at the
President's expense.
Morrison illustrates the tendency of
functionalism to be "evolutionary in method,. . . to rest on a theory of
balance of powers rather than strict separation [, and to] ... permit
'289
structural innovations.
(c) Functionalism and Formalism in Federalism Cases

In contrast to the separation of powers cases, the Supreme
Court's federalism decisions resist neat division into formalist and
functionalist categories. Theoretically, the categories work similarly
in the federalism context: a formalist resolves state/federal power
struggles by using the Constitution's text, history, and structure, while
a functionalist more likely resolves such disputes by balancing the
values underlying the state/federal structure of our government. 290 In
application, however, the formalist and functionalist categories blurperhaps because of the relative dearth of actual constitutional text
governing federalism. 291
By necessity, an apparently formalist

approach must therefore include some form of ad hoc interpretation,
given the limited explicit guidance in the text and structure of the
292
Constitution itself.

288. Id. at 693.
289. Kathleen M., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109 HARV. L. REV. 78, 93
(1995).
290. E.g., Caminker, supra note 260, at 161-62 (describing functionalist and formalist
approaches in the federalism context).
291. Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997
Sup. CT. REV. 199, 202 (observing that the "Constitution says a great deal, both explicitly
and implicitly, about.., the organization and interaction of the three federal departments.
But there is a comparative dearth of textual, historical, structural, and conceptual
guideposts with respect to the congressional regulation of state governmental activities.").
See also Lynn A. Baker, The Revival of States' Rights: A ProgressReport and a Proposal,
22 HARV. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 95 (1998) (observing that the functionalist approach for
federalism issues "is not at all inconsistent with a respect for history and the Framers'
intent.... One might... conclude that the Framers intended the Commerce Clause, the
Spending Clause, and the Tenth Amendment... to serve as real constraints on the
exercise of federal power .... ).
292. Caminker, supra note 291. at 202 (observing that because the dearth of textual and
structural guideposts governing federalism, the apparently formalist decision in Printz
engaged in an "interpretative enterprise" that "inevitably rests on ad hoc judgments"); see
Chemerinsky, supra note 276, at 970 (asserting that the "flaw of formalism in the area of
federalism is the impossibility of any clear premises for reasoning").
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Despite the soft underbelly of the Court's formalist federalism,
several classic examples of apparently formalist examples appear in
the case reporters. NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery, 293 for instance,

relies on a clearly delineated state sphere of authority, encompassing
"traditional" and "integral" state functions and protected from
congressional penetration. 294 Similarly, U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton,295 in which the Court struck down state laws barring

United States congressional candidates who had already served
maximum terms from running for reelection, evinces formalism in
both the majority and dissent. Interestingly, both opinions employed
mirror image, formalist premises: 296 with the majority concluding that
states possess only that power over the federal government the
Constitution expressly describes 297 and the dissent arguing that the
states are assumed to possess powers over the federal government

298
unless the Constitution necessarily withholds the states' authority.
Conflicting default premises also animate recent Eleventh
Amendment cases-with Justices in the majority arguing that state
immunity from suit was a founding premise of our constitutional
design 299 and dissenting Justices suggesting that the immunity enjoyed
by states is limited by the spirit, if not the words, of the Eleventh

Amendment.

00

293. 426 U.S. 833 (1985).
294. Id. at 847. Kathleen Sullivan also includes the anti-commandeering approach of
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), in the "classically formalist" category
because it delineates clear limits on congressional interference with state process.
Sullivan, supra note 289, at 97. Accord Chemerinsky, supra note 278, at 961 (arguing that
New York v. United States was part of a series of 1990s federalism cases in which the court
"reasoned deductively" from premises in a "highly formalistic" way); but cf Caminker,
supra note 260, at 161 (questioning "efforts to defend on formalist grounds" National
League of Cities and Printz).
295. 514 U.S 779 (1995).
296. Sullivan, supra note 289, at 80 (describing the "opposite structural default rules" of
majority and dissent).
297. U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 838.
298. Id. at 848 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
299. E.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 722 (1999) (reasoning that Congress proposed
that the Eleventh Amendment "acted not to change but to restore the original
constitutional design" that states are immune from all suits); Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996) (maintaining that state protection from federal court suit
can be understood only in light of the "background principle" of broad state sovereign
immunity).
300. E.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,760 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that
states enjoy immunity from suit only to the extent of its "limited codification" in the
Eleventh Amendment); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 83-95 (1996)
(Souter, J.) (arguing against interpreting state protection from suit using a presumption of
broad reaching sovereign immunity).
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Recent history also contains examples of decisions that make less
pretense at categorical premises. Indeed, the Court's decision in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority3 0 1 reflects the
type of practical, balancing analysis emblematic of functionalism.

Rejecting National League of Cities' insistence on "judicial appraisal
of whether a particular governmental function is 'integral' or
'traditional. ' ' 30 2 Garcia declared this approach "unworkable in
practice. ' 30 3 Identifying the federal political process as effective in
protecting federalism values, the Garcia Court effectively balanced
3°4
against state prerogatives the need for federal statutory norms.
Like separation of powers cases, the federalism cases show a

discernible confluence between result and jurisprudential approachwith the cases evincing formalist reasoning tending to protect state
sovereignty and cases upholding the supremacy of federal authority
reflecting functionalist reasoning. 30 5 This pattern, however, has

interruptions. Some decisions are ambiguous in their jurisprudential
30 7
approach 30 6 and others simply illustrate a contrary confluence.

301. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
302. Id. at 546-47.
303. Id. at 546.
304. Id. at 552-57.
305. See Chemerinsky, supra note 276, at 959-61 (arguing that United States v. Lopez,
New York v. United States, and Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida reflect formalist
reasoning).
306. The recent decisions evaluating Congress's exercises of power under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment show this equivocation. On one hand, the cases appear
formalist by deducing limitations on Congress's power from the unmodified premise of
supreme judicial review power. On the other hand, the "congruence and proportionality"
reasoning endorsed in the opinions has the functionalist overtones of balancing tests. See
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (mandating that the judiciary must
evaluate Congress's section 5 legislation to evaluate whether it reflects "a congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to
that end." For a case applying this test, see, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents. 528
U.S. 62, 63 (2000) (concluding that "the substantive requirements the ADEA imposes on
state and local governments are disproportionate to any unconstitutional conduct that
conceivably could be targeted by the Act").
307. For a decision applying formalist reasoning in a decision favoring federal power,
see Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000). Chief Justice Rehnquist's unanimous decision
of the Court relied almost exclusively on the categorical distinction between federal
statutes that regulate "states in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens" and
federal statutes that regulate states in other capacities. 528 U.S. at 142.
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(2) The Lesson of Envy and Jealousy Literature

(a) General Debates about Formalism and Functionalism
Utilitarian arguments aside, envy and jealousy are largely
pernicious emotions best banished from decisionmaking. From this
premise, logic points to the jurisprudential approach that best
The
prevents unwanted influences from tainting adjudication.
tempting answer is that formalism's constraints are better suited to
this task than the free-wheeling thinking authorized by functionalism.
Much rides, however, on formalism's ability to fulfill its promise of
constraining judicial discretion. I am among the many skeptics.
Making formalism's promise fade even more is the tendency noted
above for humans to hide their jealous and envious responses. Since
judges (as humans) have a preexisting propensity to obscure jealous
and envious emotions, monitoring formalism's track record for
purging such emotions becomes more difficult. 30 8 The possibility that
jealousy and envy may surreptitiously influence adjudication renders
less persuasive the suggestion that empirical analysis provides an
30 9
avenue for resolving the functionalism/formalism debate.
The game, though, is not up. Even given my skepticism about
whether formalism does much (if anything) to constrain discretion,
the approach may promote a habit of mind capable of diminishing
judges' expression of jealousy and envy. This beneficial consequence
derives in large part from formalism's goal of allocating
decisionmaking responsibility. As described by Frederick Schauer,
formalism instructs a decisionmaker such as a federal judge to
adjudicate based on only a limited number of factors. The judge is
"operating in a world in which rules have allocated the determination
of other factors to someone else or to some other person or
institution.1310 (In our present system of constitutional adjudication,
the formalist would designate the Framers as that "other" person or
institution to which Schauer refers.) 3n' By pursuing a formalist

308. Cf.KENNEDY, supra note 7, at 211 (analogizing jealousy in marriage with hidden
influences in adjudication: "I think we critics should proudly affirm the analogy between
our analysis of the ideological in adjudication and the Freudian tradition of hunting out
sexual motives where people are most concerned to conceal them.").
309. Sunstein, supra note 265, at 641 (offering a qualified "yes" to the question
"whether a good defense of formalism must be empirical").
310. SCHAUER, supra note 261, at 231.
311. Grey, supra note 262, at 3 (associating originalism with formalism).
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approach, the decisionmaker makes a "rational decision not to make
31 2
decisions about every detail" of life.
In other words, the judge has decided to "Let Lex Decide" the
31 3
principles applied to resolve disputes.
This analysis exposes the potentially liberating quality of rules.
With formalist marching orders in hand, the federal judge may rid her
mind of many disabling factors and focus solely on the proper
resolution of the dispute in light of the limited factors within her
"realm." The resulting job environment may be conducive to a
judge's satisfaction with her systemic role and with her ability to be
the best judge possible. The rules therefore act in the same manner
as encapsulation strategies advocated by management specialists to
segregate groups within an organization and to reduce the perception
that actors with equal status are receiving unequal job assignments.
Theoretically, the result not only provides judges with the
psychological space to cope with jealousy and envy, but also forestalls
the development of jealousy and envy altogether.
Indeed,
formalism's division of labor in the decisionmaking enterprise 314 is
also consistent with Fernandez de la Mora's advocacy of vocational
specialization as a vaccine (and/or antidote) for envy. 315 Applying
this thinking to a critique of functionalism, formalists may argue that
functionalism's tendency to blur distinctions and rulemaking roles
emboldens judges to reach beyond their assigned station and to
respond enviously against other agents in the system who allegedly
3 16
possess greater rulemaking power than their own.
This line of argument, however, implicates the irony and dual
nature of separation, which provides the organizing premise of this
paper. Although separation may on one hand foster accord by giving
government actors a sense of unique institutional role, it can also
foster discord by creating categories of power "haves" and power
"have nots." Frederick Schauer anticipates this subtlety in his

312. SCHAUER, supra note 261, at 231.

313. Alexander, supra note 263, at 537.
314. SCHAUER, supra note 261, at 230 (arguing that "rules operate as perhaps the most
important tool for the division of decisional labor").
315. FERNANDEZ DE LA MORA, supra note 69, at 126.
316. One rejoinder is that functionalism may encourage a beneficial sense of
responsibility and unique judicial input in the decisionmaking process, both of which
foster the self-esteem and self-identification thought vital for individuals coping with the
specter of jealousy and envy. Chemerinsky, supra note 274, at 984 (functionalism
encourages important judicial scrutiny of premises and competing policy choices behind
rules).
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advocacy for formalism, acknowledging that, in the world of power,
'
rules are "devices of arrogance" as well as "devices of modesty. "317
The effect of separating rulemaking power is therefore
ambiguous-the trick being to separate in a manner that fosters role
satisfaction and not resentment of those who possess other or more
supreme power. Schauer offers an important observation why
formalism may tend more to foster satisfaction than to exaggerate
resentment. He observes that formalism works with a light touch,
since the
jurisdiction-sorting force of rules is often "unnoticed" and
"silent. ' 318 According to Schauer, "it is the very silence itself, the
ability to take things off the agenda as well as put them on, that
explains much of what is valuable about rules." 319 While this
observation may not eliminate the possibility that judges covet broad
lawmaking power of other government actors, the observation is
nevertheless an important consideration in choosing formalism over
functionalism.
The notion is that formalism may improve
decisionmaking not because it directly constrains discretion, but
because it indirectly contributes to an environment that makes more
possible adjudication that is free from harmful emotions. 320
(b) Specific Issues of Judicial Review
Many arguments favoring formalism actually beg the question of
whether supreme judicial review is justified: recognizing the virtues
of rules does not perform the task of designating which government
agent should have rule-declaring authority. Although a proponent of
judicial supremacy, Schauer has alluded to this difficulty: "[w]e
remain in need of a moral theory of jurisdictional separation" in
321
rulemaking authority.
Some arguments suggest that the common law processbuttressed by stare decisis traditions-can ably cast judges
317. SCHAUER, supra note 261, at 232.
318. ML
319. ld.
at 233.
320. TUSHNET, supra note 7, at 49 (suggesting that forbearance from "all-thingsconsidered judgments" in constitutional adjudication may be possible only as a by-product
of character building experiences ("Some mental.., states.., have the property that they
can only come about as the by-product of actions undertaken for other ends. They can
never, that is, be brought about intelligently or intentionally, because the very attempt to
do so precludes the state one is trying to bring about." (quoting ELSTER, supra note 215,
at 43)).
321. Schauer, supra note 261, at 232. TUSHNET, supra note 7, at 27 (arguing that
Professors Schauer's and Alexander's arguments about constitutional design leave room
for the conclusion that a branch other than the judiciary may be best suited for supreme
decisionmaking authority about constitutional questions).
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encountering new problems in the role of primary rulemakers, with
subsequent judges bound to apply the earlier developed rules in
accordance with formalist methods. 322 Mark Tushnet submits that
supreme judicial review and formalism fit together hand in glove,
arguing that "defense of formalism turns crucially on the fact that the
person devising the set of rules, standards, and guidelines stands in a
supervisory relation to other actors. '323 In his view, under a system of
formal, supreme judicial review, judges seek to "improve the system's
overall performance when they tell other actors to follow the
formalist approach. '324 Supreme Court Justices presumably follow
their own prescriptions by applying a formalist approach in
implementing the view of their supervisors, the Framers.
Although the formalism/functionalism debate does not answer
the ultimate question of who bears the ultimate rulemaking authority,
the debate does contribute to understanding which brand of analysis
is best suited to judicial review of the various categories of
constitutional issues. As noted above, separation of powers issues
present the greatest potential for influence from jealousy and envy.
To the extent that formalism makes adjudication free from jealousy
and envy more possible, separation of powers issues are therefore
325
good candidates for formalist adjudication.
apparently more convinced of
Several commentators,
formalism's discretion-constraining potential than I, agree with this
conclusion. For example, Justice Scalia argues that formalism is
particularly important in the separation of powers area-"which has
as its purposes fostering workable government while preserving
liberty and preventing tyranny, goals which are significantly

322. Cf Rosen, supra note 265, at 633 (observing that "[b]ecause courts ordinarily
transform standards into rule-like formalizations over time, the legislature's deployment
of standards generally serves to delegate rulemaking authority to courts").
323. TUSHNET, supra note 7, at 44.
324. Id.
325. One potential counterargument lies in the observation that our separation of
powers system possesses important qualities of interdependence among the branches.

TRIBE, supra note 28, at 17 ("[I]t is institutional interdependence rather than functional
independence that best summarizes the American idea of protecting liberty by fragmenting
power."). Accord Verkuil, supra note 223, at 301 ("[Separation of powers] ... is not really
accurate as a description of how our government works-the phrase 'shared powers' says
it better."). Allowing the judiciary to take into account the interdependence of the
branches through a functionalist approach may foster a better operating system and.
therefore, provide the judiciary with a sense of belonging and synergy with other
components of the system that could keep jealousy and envy under control. Cf
Chemerinsky, supra note 276, at 961 (formalism suffers because it prevents the judiciary
from examining premises and policy considerations behind constitutional concepts).
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threatened by the ad hoc judgments fostered by functionalism. '326
Also fearful of functionalism's dearth of limitations, Martin Redish
argues for restricting the Supreme Court's role in separation of
powers cases "to determining whether the challenged branch action
falls with the definition of that branch's constitutionally derived
'327
powers-executive, legislative, or judicial.
While federalism issues are also subject to threat from jealousy
and envy influences, several scholars note that formalism is
maladapted to resolution of federalism disputes. Unlike separation of
powers disputes for which the Constitution enunciates considerable
clear and distinct rules, 328 federalism issues are guided by few explicit
provisions with the constitutional text.329 For this reason, a judge
adjudicating federalism issues must look to functionalist analysis and
the likelihood is reduced that a formalist tradition with create an
environment enabling judges to control jealousy and envy.330 Thus,
because of the dearth of formal rules as well as the reduced concern
with jealousy and envy in the federalism context, strong reason exists
to endorse functionalism for resolving such disputes.
The jealousy and envy literature suggests that, although
formalism may be unrealistic in the federalism context, reason exists
for endorsing formalism in judicial review of separation of powers
questions. This conclusion, however, presents an important practical
irony: as noted above, the formalist method predictably leads the
Supreme Court to invalidate the actions of another branch when used
in separation of powers disputes. Thus, although formalism may
326. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 426-27 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
327. REDISH, supra note 227, at 101. Redish argues that formalism is needed as a
prophylactic against the creation of a critical situation, when a grave threat of tyranny
exists. ld. at 114-15.
328. Caminker, supra note 291, at 202 (observing that the "Constitution says a great
deal, both explicitly and implicitly, about.., the organization and interaction of the three
federal departments. But there is a comparative dearth of textual, historical, structural,
and conceptual guideposts with respect to the congressional regulation of state
governmental activities.") But cf.Gwyn, supra note 29, at 263 (noting that the Framers
did not include an explicit separation of powers theory in the Constitution).
329. Caminker, supra note 291, at 202 (given the dearth of formal guideposts for
deciding federalism questions, "the interpretative enterprise inevitably rests on ad hoc
judgments"); Chemerinsky, supra note 276, at 970 (formalism is particularly inapt in the
federalism context because no provision of the Constitution speaks directly to the
allocation of power between the state and national governments; even the principles of the
10th amendment and the limited nature of the federal power grants are subject to
countervailing provisions such as the supremacy clause).
330. This same argument may apply to those individual rights issues for which little, if
any, determinate constitutional language provides guidance-such as the right to privacy
and substantive due process questions.
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create an environment that suppresses the development and negative
effects of jealousy and envy, it also creates an outlet, under the guise
331
of objectivity, for expressing these emotions.
For these reasons, the literature on envy and jealousy may
endorse formalism for separation of power disputes, but significant
qualifications mitigate the endorsement. One notion, however, is
certain: the inconsistency evinced in the modern caselaw increases
dysfunction and that dysfunction significantly curtails the judiciary's
332
ability to avoid jealousy and envy in decisionmaking.
Conclusion
Literature analyzing envy and jealousy holds many potential
benefits for governmental theory and doctrine. The literature's
usefulness is limited only by the many issues touching interbranch
relationships in our institutions. This article only begins to use the
material, showing how these sentiments may influence factors
establishing the appropriate judicial role in constitutional
adjudication. Evidence of jealousy and envy may help to demonstrate
the accuracy of one premise of the Framers: the necessity of
constitutional structure to avoid tyranny by restraining the ambitions
of those that staff government-a premise that has not been without
333
critics.
First, importing coping devices into the structure of government
can help avoid the deleterious effects of jealousy and envy. Second,
understanding how jealousy and envy operate can assist government
in better harnessing the power of these emotions to strengthen our
institutions rather than weaken them.
For issues surrounding judicial review in particular, the envy and
jealousy literature suggest tentative conclusions. First, the judiciary's
envy and jealousy toward other branches may be best controlled
through some supreme judicial review, albeit review minimized
through active self-restraint. To the extent that supreme judicial
review is stratified by subject matter, individual rights questions pose
331. The United States Supreme Court's recently aggressive federalism decisionswhich make an attempt at formalist reasoning-also provide potential evidence of this
phenomenon.
332. Chemerinsky, supra note 246, at 1084 (arguing that the Supreme Court's
"methodological disparity" in separation of powers cases is particularly damaging because
these cases are "so important to governance of the nation").
333. VILE, supra note 5, at 332-41 (1998) (describing Robert A. Dahl's challenge to the
theory that a constitutional structure separating powers among different government
branches is necessary to prevent tyranny, citing DAHL, supra note 43).
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the least threat to fostering expression of jealousy and envy.
Federalism questions are more problematic, but not nearly as
troublesome as separation of powers disputes-which often implicate
the judiciary's power in relation to those for whom it harbors jealous
and envious sentiments. Finally, to the extent that review of
separation of powers issues is maintained, formalism may help control
jealousy and envy, although this suggestion holds complications
because formalism also could actually be used to implement these
emotions under the guise of objectivity.
For legal scholarship, future uses of the jealousy and envy
literature present themselves. In the context of the judiciary, the
literature holds much to inform the myriad institutional issues
confronting modem courts-particularly given the "transformations
in the kinds, places, and activities of federal judging" in the last
several decades 34 Another phenomenon meriting further study
concerns the effect of making changes to the judiciary's role on other
branches of government. Although one may fine tune the rules
governing judicial review so as to ameliorate the effects of jealousy
and envy in the judicial function, any changes may have effects on
other branches, such as enhancing the extent to which jealousy and
335
envy are experienced by members of Congress or the Executive.
True improvement to our constitutional system may therefore require
further study of the forces of jealousy and envy within these two
branches as well.

334. Resnik, supra note 42, at 657. For further materials on the changing roles of
federal judges, see e.g., Judith Resnik, History, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts:
Changing Contexts, Selective Memories, and Limited Imagination, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 171
(1995); Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges,96 HARv. L. REV.376 (1982).
335. But cf. GLEICK, supra note 144, at 144-45 (noting that scientists maintain that the
relationships among three bodies in a system are "most often impossible" to track).

